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The recent wave of terrorist attacks has increased the attention paid to money 
laundering activities.  Using several methodologies, this paper investigates 
empirically the determinants of money laundering and its regulation in over 80 
countries by assembling a cross-country dataset on proxies for money laundering 
and the prevalence of feeding activities. The paper additionally constructs specific 
money laundering regulation indices based on available information on laws and 
their mechanisms of enforcement and measures their impact on money laundering 
proxies.  The paper finds that tougher money laundering regulations, particularly 
those that criminalize feeding activities and improve disclosure, are linked to 
lower levels of money laundering across countries; the results are robust to 
potential endogeneity of money laundering regulation.  The relevance of historical 
factors in explaining the variation of money laundering regulation across 
countries sheds light on theories of institutions and provides room for further 
action, particularly in the areas of the law that improve the impact of 
criminalization, including liability of intermediaries, reductions of the burden of 
proof and better disclosure.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The recent wave of international terrorism and the increased concerns about drug activities have 
led to an increased focus on money laundering and its regulation.  In fact, money laundering is 
not a recent phenomenon and has occupied the minds of policymakers and regulators for many 
centuries.
1  The forms may vary, but illegal activities that act as feeders to money laundering 
have always searched for processes to turn their proceeds into usable assets.  Although the 
relevance of money laundering seems to be growing, there is relatively very little theoretical and 
even less empirical academic work on the topic. In this paper we provide a first empirical look at 
the determinants of money laundering and its regulation in over 80 countries.  We analyze the 
specific features of money laundering regulation in each country and examine the relationship 
between these regulations and various measures of money laundering and its feeder activities.  
Finally, we ainterpret these relationships in light of the available theories of institutions and the 
relevance of historical factors in explaining the variation of regulation across countries. 
Although there is very little work focusing on the theory of optimal money laundering 
regulation, our understanding of the theories of regulation in other areas, such as crime and the 
regulation of legal markets, can help us formulate testable theories about money laundering 
regulation.  In this paper we consider the effect of law and regulations on money laundering at 
two levels.  At the first level, the question is whether statutory laws on money laundering matter 
at all.  In fact, an important tradition in law and economics, originating in the work of Coase 
(1960) and Stigler (1964), holds that statutory laws are either irrelevant or counterproductive.  
Specific money laundering regulation may not be effective because it targets the wrong area: 
money laundering is only the outcome of illegal activities. That is, it is a symptom but not the 
cause.  According to this view, feeder activities are the ones that should be regulated, as their 
effective monitoring and control will naturally lead to a reduction in money laundering.  This 
view suggests that an efficient set of legal tools to deal with criminal activities and good 
enforcement by courts should suffice for the containment of money laundering.  The legal 
framework is complemented by the reputational concerns of financial institutions, as a large 
                                                           
1 Money laundering is not a modern phenomenon but it has a long history. In his book Lord of the Rim, historian 
Sterling Seagrave describes how, more than three thousand years ago, merchants in China concealed their wealth by 
moving cash outside of their own jurisdiction, trading at inflated prices or converting money into movable assets in 
case they might be banished by their rulers. Although mechanisms and reasons have changed, all these techniques 
are still used by current launderers.   5  
portion of money laundering take place through financial institutions which have reputations to 
maintain.  These concerns mean that financial intermediaries themselves have an interest in 
trying not to facilitate “dirty” transactions.  Therefore, reputations and a solid body of crime 
regulation should keep laundering of cash under control and may render anti-money laundering 
legislation ineffective.       
It has also been pointed out that anti-money laundering legislation comes at a cost.   
Masciandro (1998) analyzes the development of Italian regulation and proposes a generalized 
model that shows that  anti-money laundering regulation negatively impacts the efficiency of 
banks; legislation is less effective the more it reduces bank efficiency.  Rahn (2001) postulates 
that anti-money laundering legislation has been completely ineffective in dealing with drug 
trafficking and may have actually fostered crimes such as kidnappings, smuggling and 
racketeering.  He argues that honest individuals are having a harder time hiding their assets from 
kidnappers, criminals and corrupt governments, thus fostering the growth of the criminal 
industry.  As during the Prohibition years in the U.S., anti-money laundering is a classic case of 
“police creating increased demand for their services by inventing new crimes, which in turn 
creates a new criminal industry to evade the new laws” (Rahn, 2001).  For all of these reasons, 
specific regulation of money laundering could be thought of as either irrelevant or even 
detrimental in so far as it raises costs and interferes with the functioning of markets.
2 
  An alternative tradition argues that “law matters.” In particular, statutory regulations are 
an important institution controlling the illegal sector of the economy.  This argument has a long 
tradition in regulatory economics (see, for example, Landes, 1998 in the area of securities law).  
According to this view, the basic legal framework controlling crime is insufficient to keep 
money laundering under control because the incentives to engage in such activities might be too 
high for “long-run” benefits of honesty to matter and because litigation may be too unpredictable 
and expensive to serve as a deterrent (see, e.g., Djankov et al., 2002).  To counter these 
problems, a regulatory framework is required.  Our first cut in the empirical work in this paper 
will aim to directly distinguish the irrelevance hypothesis from the “law matters” hypothesis in 
the context of money laundering.  
                                                           
2 According to Camdessus (1998), there are those who hold an extreme view that regulation cannot curtail money 
laundering in the current environment of financial markets liberalization. They suggest that keeping in place 
centralized credit allocation and foreign exchange control systems is necessary to identify money launderers –even   6  
This discussion brings us to the second level of analysis: if money laundering regulation 
does matter, what about it makes a difference?  In most simple frameworks that analyze the 
impact of law and regulation, courts are modeled or assumed as functioning in the background 
with the appropriate legal tools to make criminal legislation work and achieve its goals.  But this 
may hardly be the case, not only because of the shortcomings of the efficiency of the judicial 
system itself (see La Porta et al., 2001, and Djankov et al., 2002), but also because not all 
legislation provides the appropriate set of “legal tools” to facilitate the fight against crime.  
At this deeper level, there are two views of what matters, both based on the proposition 
that, while enforcement is costly and unpredictable, money laundering laws and regulation can 
reduce enforcement costs.  If money launderers are rational profit-maximizers, like other 
criminals, deterrence is essential in order to curtail their behavior.   If we apply Becker’s (1968) 
ideas on crime and punishment, deterrence can come from several areas of law that would make 
laundering activities less profitable.  The first view emphasizes the important role played by 
preventive measures that increase the probability of catching money launderers. This view holds 
that standardized disclosures and clearer liability rules that create incentives for all participants 
are key for prevention and lower enforcement costs.  This view relies heavily on the role of 
financial intermediaries in the laundering process.  To the extent that a large fraction of cash 
laundered goes through bank or non-bank financial institutions at some point, money laundering 
regulation can standardize disclosures by these institutions.  Without standardized disclosures, 
there are large costs involved in detection of criminal activities.  Money laundering regulation 
can provide the additional service of explicitly setting forth the obligations of various parties and 
burdens of proof, thereby reducing the costs to the court of establishing liability.
3    
                                                                                                                                                                                           
though we now have substantial empirical evidence that such control comes at the cost of economic growth and 
development. 
3 Under this view, the application of clear liability standards to all participants in money laundering transactions 
could prove helpful.  Similar to the perspective adopted in financial markets in the United States in the 1930s, with 
the Securities Act of 1933 and 1934, a tougher liability standard could be established for those financial 
intermediaries through which money laundering takes place.  Since they are sophisticated institutions, they will 
themselves develop the mechanisms to detect and report laundering.  They have the incentives to disclose all 
available information on their clients simply because failing to do so could cause people to think the worst.  If 
financial intermediaries were to be held liable and bear some responsibility, they would probably find a higher 
incentive to act as an arm of the state, thus reducing the need for a lengthy body of specific regulations.  This 
perspective uses banks and other financial institutions as screeners rather than reporters and places a burden on them 
to monitor compliance by its clients. The data in this version of the paper do not allow us to test this theory directly, 
but we are gathering the data to do so.    7  
The second view emphasizes the powers of the enforcer and argues for the 
criminalization of offenses, better confiscation rules, and increased international cooperation and 
intervention to curtail money laundering.  Powerful enforcement can be essential to curtailing 
money laundering, as it allows the collection of information and the setting of rules that facilitate 
enforcement and sanction misconduct.  Several mechanisms can be used to induce deterrence in 
this area.  First, several of the feeder activities to money laundering are not considered criminal 
acts in several countries, and one may think that criminalization would raise the stakes for the 
criminal and would thus deter action and/or facilitate the work of courts. A second area where 
more specific legislation may be needed is confiscation.  There are marked differences across 
national legislations on the powers to confiscate proceeds from criminal activities.   If criminals 
and their organizations are able to keep their gains, convictions and prison sentences may not be 
enough to deter such crimes.  Therefore, a powerful system of confiscation would be more cost 
effective and could be an important deterrent to criminal activity and money laundering.  Finally, 
this theory also points to the potential benefits of a powerful agency, with broad powers, 
specialized in pursuing launderers. Indeed, international cooperation and joint action are 
important elements in the fight against money laundering.  
The disclosure view and the powerful enforcement view are, of course, not mutually 
exclusive. Whether better disclosure or a more powerful set of mechanisms to facilitate 
enforcement is more effective in curtailing money laundering and its feeding activities is an open 
question. The empirical work in this paper will aim at discovering which elements matter most.
4 
To address these issues, we gathered a large cross-country dataset of money laundering 
proxies in the 1990s spanning over 80 jurisdictions.  We also assembled a database of rules and 
regulations on money laundering from two different sources, then organized the data to produce 
quantitative measures of money laundering regulation that capture the theoretical questions 
raised above. Finally, we examine in some detail the relationship between specific legal 
arrangements and proxies for money laundering.  The results reveal evidence that money 
laundering regulations indeed matter, and they give us a first look at the ways in which they do.  
Our results are robust to potential endogeneity of money laundering regulation.  The relevance of 
                                                           
4 In this paper, we take a first cut at this question with some general indices about each of these activities.  We are 
currently undertaking other work to look deeper into the details of the various mechanisms at play since specific 
features of liabilities, burden of proof and confiscation may be relevant.   8  
historical factors in explaining the variation of money laundering regulation across countries 
sheds light on the theories of institutions and provides room for further action.   
 
2. Measuring Money Laundering and its Feeders 
 
By definition, money laundering is trying to legitimize the proceeds of illegal activities while 
maintaining the value of the acquired assets.  In short, it describes the process by which “dirty” 
money is turned into “clean” money.
5 Obviously, money laundering cannot be done in the open 
and requires sometimes sophisticated means to disguise the actual origins of the assets.  In many 
instances, the process requires the intervention of some financial institution.  While money 
laundering attracts the most attention when associated with trafficking of illicit narcotics, and 
more recently, with terrorist activities, enterprising criminals of every sort, from stock cheaters to 
corporate embezzlers to commodity smugglers, launder money since the money per se can be the 
target of investigation and action.
6  Money laundering may occur almost anywhere in the world, 
and it has become a significant global problem with potentially increasingly serious social and 
economic ramifications.
7 
Given the clandestine nature of money laundering, it is quite problematic to assess the 
volume in terms of economic repercussions. There are some estimates that calculate the impact 
of money laundering to account between 2 and 5 percent of global gross domestic product, which 
amounts to about 1.5 to 2.0 trillion dollars per year (International Monetary Fund, 2001).
8  
In the rest of this section, we first describe our procedures for data construction of the 
proxies of money laundering and the logic behind the specific variables.  We then present some 
information about the data, including the variation of money laundering across jurisdictions.   
                                                           
5 Spremann (2001) provides a vivid description of the stages and techniques involved in money laundering breaking 
the process into: (1) placing of illegal funds; (2) layering of the funds to make their origin untraceable; and (3) 
integrating the funds into the financial system. 
6 United Nations (2000). 
7 A non-exhaustive list of negative impacts of money laundering include: (1) economic distortions, as launderers 
care less about profits and invest more inefficiently than legitimate investors; (2) monetary instability, due to 
inexplicable changes in money demand and volatility (World Bank, 2003); (3) loss of financial integrity and 
reputation risks, due to the potentially large sums of money that may be suddenly withdrawn from the system 
(Bartlett, 2002; Bair, 2002); (4) loss of taxes and deviation of government resources to curtail criminal activities 
(United Nations, 1998; James, 2002); (5) increased corruption; and (6) socio-economic repercussions as a result of 
increased criminal activity (Dowers and Palmreuther, 2003; Drayton, 2002). 
8 Using similar methodologies for the case of Latin America, a rough estimate of money laundering in the region 
appears to be somewhere between 2.5 and 6.3 percent of the annual regional gross domestic product (IDB, 2004).   9  
  A review of the literature suggests that we can group the main sources of money 
laundering into three categories: criminal activities, such as drug traffic or import smuggling, the 
underground economy, and tax evasion.  The most commonly used approach to get at the 
measurement of money laundering is thus to estimate proxies for the size of these feeding 
activities, and several studies have analyzed the links and interrelations of these activities and 
money laundering.  As Reuter and Truman (2004) have pointed out, the measurement of the true 
amounts of money being laundered is difficult due to its very nature. For this reason, and aware 
of all the caveats, we adopt the approach of calculating several different proxies using different 
methodologies for obtaining estimates of the feeder activities that generate the cash that needs to 
be cleaned.
9  We complement these numbers with subjective measures from surveys on the 
prevalence of laundering activities across countries.  Although each individual measure is subject 
to potential criticisms, this comprehensive approach captures different aspects of money 
laundering and its feeding activities and provides useful boundaries of the potential amounts of 
cash and economic activity devoted to this effort.  We have calculated and gathered data for six 
different proxies for money laundering across countries, spanning some of its main dimensions.  
The exact definitions of each variable are shown in Table 1, while the data on cross-country 
measures of money laundered are presented in Tables 2 and 3. 
The first three measures we calculate estimate proxies for money laundering indirectly by 
measuring the underground economy as the discrepancy between the official (or declared) value 
of a macro series and its actual (or estimated) value following several methodologies.  The first 
method we use is commonly known as the “currency demand” approach. This was first used by 
Cagan (1958), who calculated a correlation between tax pressure and currency demand for the 
first half of the 1900s in the US, and later by Gutmann (1977) who developed a similar idea 
                                                           
9 A very good description of the methodologies used, their advantages and shortcomings can be found in Schneider 
and Klinglmair (2004).  Some of the methods typically employed to measure the impact of money laundering on 
GDP include measuring (i) the discrepancy between income and expenditure measures of GDP reported in national 
accounts statistics, assuming that expenditures will be reasonably well reported but that elements of income will be 
concealed or underreported; (ii) the discrepancy between the official and actual labor force, assuming that a decline 
in participation in the official market may reflect increasing activity in the underground economy; (iii) the 
discrepancy between official GDP and total nominal GDP (transactions approach), assuming a constant relationship 
over time between the volume of transactions and official GDP (Fisher’s quantity equation); (iv) the discrepancy 
between actual or “excess” demand for money and the demand for money that can be explained by conventional or 
normal factors (currency demand approach), assuming that cash is the primary means of payment used to settle 
transactions in the underground economy; and (v) the discrepancy between actual and official GDP estimated on the 
basis of electricity consumption, assuming that economic activity and electricity consumption move together, with 
an electricity/GDP elasticity close to one.   10  
regarding the comparative advantage of money over checks for payment of purchases of services 
and goods that individuals can conceal from authorities.  This approach was further developed 
econometrically by Tanzi (1980, 1983) estimating a currency demand function.
10  To apply the 
currency demand method, we used annual data on Currency Holdings and Demand deposits and 
we have computed two time averages for 52 countries for the years between 1980 and 2000 and 
between 1990 and 2000.
11   
For the second data series, we use the methodology developed in Kaufmann and 
Kaliberda (1996).  According to this method, the size of the informal economy is best measured 
by the discrepancy between an indicator of the overall economic activity and the official gross 
domestic product. Given the high correlation between consumption of electricity and economic 
activity, the growth rate of electricity consumption serves as an indicator of the evolution of 
GDP.
12 Hence, any difference between the growth of electricity consumption and GDP growth 
can be attributed to changes in the size of the informal economy. We labeled this as the 
“Electricity differences” approach in the tables of the paper. To calculate this measure, we use 
the data on total electricity consumption from the World Bank, 2004. Data on real (official) gross 
domestic product, measured as the nominal GDP deflated by the implicit gross domestic product 
deflator, were obtained from the International Monetary Fund. Using annual observations, we 
                                                           
10 This method assumes that the ratio of currency to demand deposits is affected only by the growth of unreported 
transactions (currency-ratio method); that the income velocities of reported and unreported transactions are identical; 
and that in some base period, unreported income was zero, so that the observed base period currency deposit ratio 
serves as a proxy for the desired currency ratio in the official economy.  As described by Feige (1989), these 













where C, D and ko denote currency holdings, demand deposits and the desired currency-deposits 
ratio, respectively. The intuition behind this equation is that any positive deviation from the desired level of the 
currency to deposits ratio (which stays constant over time) is caused by an increase in the demand for currency, 
which in turn is produced by the increase of the size of the informal economy. 
11 One of the most common critiques of this method involves its assumption of constancy of the income velocity of 
money. As mentioned by Hanousek and Palda (2003), financial developments may result in instability in money 
demand. Other criticisms of the methodology are reviewed in  Reuter and Truman (2003) and Schneider and 
Klinglmair (2004).   
12 This assumes that the elasticity of electricity consumption to gross domestic product should be close to one. 
Recognizing that this assumption may be too strong the authors perform sensitivity analysis allowing the value of 
the elasticity to vary across countries and time, which may account for technological changes in production process, 
variations of the sectoral composition of GDP and different production structures across countries. Following this, in 
order to account for the fact that economies may become more efficient in the use of electricity, we assume that  
elasticity decreases by 0.05 from decade to decade (from 1.15 in the 1960s to a value of 1 in the 1990s). In this first 
approach, we use the average for the last decade.  In the regression analysis we show the results of adopting the 
constant elasticity assumption, and the alternative measures constructed using decreasing elasticity lead to similar 
results.   11  
computed two different time averages for the windows 1980-2000 and 1990-2000 for 67 
countries.
13  
  The third proxy from money laundering and its feeder activities is labeled “Shadow 
Economy” in our tables and comes from the calculations performed in Schneider and Klinglmair 
(2004).  They calculated a measure of the shadow economy for 110 countries mostly following a 
dynamic multiple-indicators multiple-causes approach (DYMIMIC).  The benefit of this 
approach is that, unlike the previous two methodologies, which estimate the size and 
development of the underground economy considering only one indicator,  this model approach 
explicitly considers multiple causes for the growth of the shadow economy and multiple effects 
of the shadow economy over time. The multiple causes used in the model include the burden of 
taxation, citizens’ attitudes towards taxes, and the burden of regulation.  Some of the multiple 
indicators or effects include the development of monetary, labor market and production market 
measures.
14     
Abstracting from any peculiar characteristic of each method, this indirect approach has 
the caveat of providing only a rough (residual) measure of a country’s underground economy. 
Hence, it is not able to disentangle the pure (or specific) quantity of money laundered with 
respect to the rest of the illegal activities in the economy.
15 
Table 2 shows the means and medians for these three variables around the world and 
across geographical regions, providing some statistical tests of the differences.  The data show 
that, under these three proxies of the underground economy, the scope for money laundering is 
quite large, amounting from 19 (15) percent to 31 (32) percent of GDP for the average (median) 
country in the world.  The group with the largest average is Latin America, exceeding 40 
percentage points in two of the three measures.  African numbers, although lower, are not 
statistically different than those of Latin America.  The third largest region in terms of scope for 
money laundering, according to these measures, is Asia and Oceania (which includes some 
OECD countries, such as Japan and Australia).  The numbers for this region range between 20 
                                                           
13 Some of the shortcomings of this method include: (1) the fact that not all hidden activities are electricity intensive; 
(2) there could be large changes in the elasticity of electricity to GDP across countries and over time (although we 
experimented with several numbers and that did not make a large difference for the results); and (3) the fact that 
technological progress has made production and consumption of electricity more efficient over time.   
14 The empirical methodology is best explained in the appendix of Schneider and Klinglmair (2004).  The method is 
very different from the one used in the previous two variables and involves the use of statistical theory of 
unobserved variables with multiple causes and multiple effects of the phenomenon measured.   12  
and 30 percent of economic activity. The Middle East is in fact the region that comes closest to 
the developed world (Europe and North America). The means and medians for this region are not 
statistically different from those of Europe and North America.  Even in this last group, the scope 
for money laundering is large, ranging between 15 (13) and 24 (22) percentage points of GDP 
across measures.   
Table 3 takes a different cut at the data.  As the table shows, when we rank countries 
according to the size of their GDP, only the largest 25
th percentile of countries have statistically 
significant lower measures of money laundering proxied by the underground economy.  Tables 2 
and 3 signal the widespread reach of money laundering.  Two basic facts come across. First, only 
the very few largest economies, mostly OECD countries, have statistically lower levels of money 
laundering activity than the rest of the world. Second, even in those countries, the magnitude of 
feeder activities is substantially large, reaching levels between 11 to 22 percentage points of 
GDP.  As Reuter and Truman (2004) have argued, these may be rough upper bound estimates of 
the demand for laundering activities, but their magnitudes deserve policymakers’ attention. 
Since macroeconomic estimates of money laundering and its feeder activities have 
potential measurement problems, we also compile additional data that address money laundering 
in a more direct, yet subjective fashion.  We gathered data from surveys of investors conducted 
by the World Economic Forum (WEF) in nearly 80 countries.  The first of the three measures, 
shown in the fourth column of Tables 2 and 3, attempts to measure the potential for money  
laundering as it relates to tax evasion.  As noted above, tax evasion is another major feeder 
activity of money laundering, as businesses and individuals hasten to clean their unreported 
income. Respondents were asked to rate from 1 (pervasive) to 7 (extremely rare) the degree of 
tax evasion in their respective jurisdiction.  The numbers shown are those pertaining to the 
answers in the 2001-2002 report, the last time the WEF included this question.  The statistics 
show a similar pattern to those that calculated money laundering demand through quantitative 
methods, although not entirely.  Latin America remains the only region with statistically 
significant higher tax evasion (lower tax compliance) than Europe and Asia.  The rest of the 
numbers are not statistically different from each other among the developing and developed 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
15 Finding a more precise measure of money laundering in a country from this residual quantity is, in our view, the 
most challenging motive for future research on this topic.   13  
(Europe and North American) nations.  Table 3 shows the same pattern with very similar tax 
evasion patterns among quartiles of the size of the economy. 
The last two measures we use as proxies for money laundering are also opinion surveys 
taken from the 2003 edition of the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report, but 
this time the measures involve direct questions about the prevalence of money laundering 
through bank and non-bank channels.  The scale of answers also goes from 1 (pervasive) to 7 
(extremely rare).  The data for these two measures produce almost identical patterns as the data 
on the three quantitative measures.  As Table 2 shows, Latin America has the lowest mean and 
median scores for both measures, which are in fact statistically significantly lower than any other 
region in the world, this time including Africa. Europe and North America rank with the lowest 
level of prevalence of money laundering activities through banks while the Middle East is even a 
bit lower than Europe for money laundering through non-bank channels.  Finally, Table 3 closely 
mimics the rest of the table: only the largest economies have lower levels of money laundering 
activities via bank or non-bank channels.   
Overall, opinion surveys match the results of the quantitative methods, which should 
possibly increase our degree of confidence in the latter estimators.  None of these measures is 
perfect, but they all seem to move together quite nicely.  This is indeed the message of Table 4, 
which reports pair-wise correlations among all our proxies for money laundering across 
countries. All the correlation coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.   
Again, the high degree of association among all of these different measures using different 
methodologies suggests that, although imperfect, these statistics may say something about 
money laundering and its prevalence that would allow us to make safer inferences in the 
following sections of the paper when we introduce regulation measures.   
 
3. The Regulation of Money Laundering   
 
A crucial issue for the current policy debate is whether anti-money laundering laws and 
regulation play a significant role in curtailing laundering and/or feeder activities.  Several authors 
have looked at this question for some specific countries (e.g., Reuter and Truman, 2004) and 
others have argued, sometimes in a cross-national context, that under certain conditions anti-
money laundering legislation can be useful when combined with anti-tax evasion or anti-crime 
policies (i.e., Alworth and Masciandaro, 2003; Masciandaro, 2000).  Although our goal is   14  
somewhat similar to other papers, our approach is different from the papers mentioned above.  
Our data first attempt to capture the aggregate stance or strength of the regulation of anti-money 
laundering legislation and enforcement efforts in order to answer the general first-level question 
of the relevance of this set of rules.  In a second effort, we try to classify and codify this data into 
various categories motivated by the theories of optimal regulation in this area as spelled out in 
the introduction of the paper.  The ultimate goal is thus to determine what measures of the law 
seem to matter most—if they matter at all. 
In this section, we explain our data and methodology for the construction of anti-money 
laundering regulation indices.  Following the literature on what areas of the law could work and 
why, we have divided each index into three major sub-indices that try to capture narrower 
aspects of regulation. These three sub-indices are: (1) disclosure of information by financial 
intermediaries; (2) criminalization of crimes and confiscation of proceeds; and (3) international 
cooperation.  Table 1 describes in detail the data in each of these areas and how they is codified.  
Our data on the regulation of money laundering are based on two different sources.  In 
both cases, we examined the available information and transformed it into quantitative indices 
that allow us to test hypotheses empirically.  
The first data source is the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) of 
the United States State Department.  This annual publication, which describes the efforts of key 
countries to attack all aspects of the international drug trade, contains a section dedicated to 
money laundering and financial crimes. Since 1996, U.S. officials from agencies with anti-
money laundering responsibilities meet to assess the money laundering situation in more than 
185 jurisdictions.  The review includes an assessment of the significance of financial transactions 
in the country’s financial institutions that involve proceeds of serious crime, steps taken or not 
taken to address financial crime and money laundering, each jurisdiction’s vulnerability to 
money laundering, the conformity of its laws and policies to international standards, the 
effectiveness with which the government has acted, and the government’s political will to take 
needed actions. Over the last nine years U.S. officials have collected data on 16 different areas, 
of which we have focused on the 12 binary indicators that assess the compliance of the 
jurisdiction to combat money laundering and that appear in all years since 1996. Following 
previous codification methodologies used in La Porta et al. (1998 and 2000) and Botero et. al. 
(2004), we assign a value of “1” to countries when there are laws and regulations pertaining to   15  
the specific area measures in that year, thus adding a point, and zero otherwise.  When we 
aggregate these numbers across measures we obtain higher scores for countries where more anti-
money laundering regulations have been enacted.
16 We followed this procedure for each year and 
each country from 1996 to 2004 and computed country-year average scores for three periods: (a) 
1996-2000; (b) 2001-2004; and (c) 1996-2004.  This classification was undertaken in order to  
detect the changes in regulation following the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United 
States, which led to increased efforts to establish anti-money laundering regulation.  The data 
presented in Table 5 show the average country scores for the periods 1996-2004 and 1996-2000 
for the aggregate index of money laundering legislation and its constituent areas.   
The second data source is the website of EstandardsForum, which provides investors, 
financial institutions and governments with comprehensive monitoring of the efforts to converge 
to international standards and codes established by the global standard-setting authorities in 12 
key areas, among which we find anti-money laundering.  Their coverage reports available 
legislation on anti-money laundering in each country in seven different areas that reflect the 
convergence of the country in question to the recommendations on money laundering made by 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).  Data are available only for 2004, but they are 
particular rich because they provide a gradation of answers regarding the extent of coverage or 
the stage at which the country is trying to deal with a specific FATF recommendation.  For this 
reason we followed a methodology that allowed us to include all of that information and 
assigned a scale of 0 (no compliance), 0.25 (intent declared), 0.5 (enacted legislation); 0.75 
(compliance in progress), and 1 (full compliance) in each of the seven categories.  Table 6 
presents the aggregate index for each country (ML Regulation, FAFT Convergence) as well as 
the results for each of the four sub-indices we calculated. 
  As mentioned above, we tried to follow the same classification of three categories in both 
datasets to provide an additional robustness check on the econometric results (financial system 
regulation or disclosure, criminalization, and international cooperation). The following sections 
describe the contents of each variable by sub-index.  
                                                           
16 Not all countries in the sample have complete data for all years.  One way of dealing with this problem, as we did 
in this paper, is to set as missing the country-year observations for which we have fewer than six of the 12 
indicators.  An alternative methodology we used (not shown in the paper) was to take country-year information into 
consideration giving a value of zero to those numbers which were missing.  The rationale behind it is that the US 
Department of State did not assign values when there was not enough information to make an assessment.   16  
3.1 Financial System Regulation and Disclosures 
The first area of interest involves mandated disclosures from financial and/or non-financial 
institutions.  As explained above, preventive measures such as standardized disclosures and 
liabilities for all participants can create the information and incentives that increase the costs of 
laundering, thus deterring criminal behavior.   In the case of the State Department data (Table 5), 
our sub-index of financial system regulation is calculated as the average of four variables that try 
to measure the degree of regulation and disclosures from financial institutions.  The first variable 
included in this index is assigned  a value of one when, by law or legislation, banks are required 
to maintain records of large transactions in currency or other monetary instruments, and zero 
otherwise.  The next two variables measure the banking requirements to maintain records over 
time and obligations to report suspicious transactions to the authorities.  The last variable in this 
index takes a value of one when the legislation of the country requires non-bank financial 
institutions to meet the same customer identification standards that apply to banks. The first 
column of Table 6 shows the same category of indicators of financial system money-laundering 
legislation, following the data on FAFT convergence.  In this case, the index is the average of 
two components only: (1) the existence of identification rules; and (2) the degree of diligence of 
financial institutions in meeting regulatory demands. 
 
3.2 Criminalization 
As mentioned above, the powers of the enforcer could serve as an important set of rules that 
increase criminals’ costs.  In the case of the U.S. State Department materials, this sub-index is 
composed of two variables. The first measure considers whether the jurisdiction has enacted laws 
criminalizing money-laundering related to drug trafficking. The second measure assigns a value 
of one to those jurisdictions that have criminalized beyond drugs, meaning the extension of the 
anti-money laundering statutes to include non-drug related money laundering.  For the case of 
the FATF convergence index, the data allow us to tackle the same question of criminalization as  
the money-laundering act, as well as some data on confiscation.  Our variable on confiscation 
measures the degree to which authorities take provisional measures and engage in the 
confiscation of laundered money. 
   17  
3.3 International Cooperation 
The final area of regulation that could help curtail money laundering involves the potential 
increase in efficiency that could be associated with the sharing of information across 
international agencies and with the joint actions undertaken by those parties.  In the case of the 
index derived from U.S. State Department information (Table 5), we have detailed information 
including on the following areas: asset sharing arrangements by law; legislation allowing banks 
to cooperate with international law enforcement; laws that requires the control and monitoring of 
flows of currency across borders; legislation providing for mutual legal assistance; rules for 
disclosure protection  safe harbor for financial institutions; and whether the jurisdiction is a party 
to the 1988 UN drug convention.  All of these measures are aggregated to form the sub-index of 
“international cooperation.”  Table 6 contains a similar index that is calculated with information 
on  convergence with FATF rules. The sub-index in this table is calculated as the simple average 
of the score of two variables: international information exchange and international confiscation. 
In the case of the FATF convergence index, we separated the variable called 
“administrative authorities” from the index in international cooperation because it speaks more 
as a measure that makes specific statements about the actions of local authorities.   The results do 
not change if we include this variable as part of the sub-indices of “international cooperation” or 
“criminalization.” 
As mentioned above, Tables 5 and 6 show the data on sub-indices, as well as the   
aggregate indices for U.S. State Department information and FATF convergence in the area of 
money laundering.  Data are organized across groups based on the log of GNP, which 
approximates the size of their economies.  The simple tests of differences in means and medians 
show that bigger economies have higher scores across all sub-indices and the aggregate indices 
of money laundering legislation.  In all cases, the economies in the three smallest quartiles have 
lower levels of regulations than the largest.  The differences between the smallest countries and 
the middle 50 percent of the sample is also statistically significant for the U.S.  State 
Department, but not for the indices of FATF convergence. 
  It is important to note the high degree of correlation between the data from the two 
different sources.  In Table 7 we observe that the aggregate indices of money laundering 
legislation based on  U.S. State Department information and on FATF convergence, respectively, 
are correlated at 0.787.  Finally, Table 7 further shows the high degree of correlations among   18  
sub-indices within the same database and with indices from the other data source. These 
correlation are all significant at 1 percent and range between 0.60 and 0.76.
17  The data seem to 
suggest that jurisdictions either act or do not act in the area of regulation. There does not seem to 
be any evidence of “regulation substitution” whereby a country would heavily regulate 
disclosures from financial markets participants without undertaking enforcement measures.  
 
4. Impact of Regulation and Enforcement on Money Laundering  
 
4.1 Anti-Money Laundering Aggregate Indices 
 
The high correlation amongst sub-indices facilitates the performance and interpretation of the  
econometric work in this section.  We are interested in understanding the effect of anti-money 
laundering regulation provisions on money laundering. We use as dependent variables the six 
proxies for money laundering and its feeder activities developed in Section 2, and to isolate the 
effect of these provisions on money laundering we control for several factors. The set of 
regressions presented throughout the paper controls for the size of the economy, which previous 
sections showed to be an important determinant of the various proxies of money laundering 
across countries.  According to North (1981), as the scale of economic activity expands, better 
institutions become affordable.  This variable could not only be picking up the scale effect 
associated with money laundering, but also part of the effect of wealth across nations, and it is 
thus a good summary variable for many country characteristics associated with the spread of the 
informal economy and tax evasion, for example. Bigger and richer countries could have a higher 
quality of institutions in general, including better property rights and rule of law, which could be 
associated with lower levels of money laundering and its feeder activities.
18  
Finally, and with the aim ensuring that we explicitly take account of enforcement, we 
also consider the effects of several proxies of the quality of enforcement by courts on the level of 
money laundering activities across countries.  Previous research on the impacts of regulation 
(Djankov et al., 2002; Botero, et. al., 2004; and La Porta et. al., 1997 and 1998) have shown that 
                                                           
17 The U.S. State Department indices for all sub-periods show a large and statistically significant correlation with the 
FATF convergence index, ranging between 0.70 and 0.82.   
18 As an additional way to control for wealth effects and other regional factors that may explain money laundering, 
we ran all regressions in the paper adding a set of continent dummies that follow the geographical breakdown used 
in Table 2.  The results do not significantly change, but the tables are not included in the paper for reasons of space.  
There are no differences amongst the dummies with the exception of Latin America, which in two-thirds of the 
variables shows consistently higher levels of money laundering as compared to Europe and North America.   19  
enforcement is a key explanatory variable.  Better enforcement by the legal system could be 
associated with lower levels of criminal activity, including money laundering, regardless of the 
content of the laws (North, 1981;  La Porta et al., 1999).  We use two different measures to proxy 
for the quality of enforcement in each country. Both of these measures come from Djankov et al. 
(2002), who collected information in over 100 jurisdictions on the regulation of civil procedures 
for the collection of a bounced check and the eviction of a non-paying tenant through the legal 
system. The data, developed with the help of law firms in each country, aim to obtain measures 
of the enforcement and efficiency of the legal system that are not contaminated by subjectivity 
and macroeconomic cyclicality, as are most other proxies in the literature.  The first of these 
measures is the logarithm of the average total duration of the legal process of collecting a 
bounced check through the courts.  This number ranges from 60 days in New Zealand to 527 in 
Colombia, and 645 in Italy. The second measure we use as a proxy for enforcement is the index 
of court formalism (or regulation) for the collection of a bounced check.  This index tries to 
measure the degree of cumbersomeness and proceduralism involved in civil procedures, which 
affects most disputes in court. The index is the result of an aggregation of seven broad aspects of 
formalism which have been shown to explain lengthy court processes and citizens’ discontent 
with the enforcement environment.  
Tables 8 and 9 present the results of regressions of our six measure of money laundering 
on the aggregate indices of money laundering regulation detailed in the previous section, the 
logarithm of GNP, and a measure of the quality of legal enforcement in each table.  The tables 
include three panels, each using a different aggregate measure of money laundering regulation.   
Across panels and tables, the size of the economy predicts lower levels of money laundering at 
its feeder activities, although significance is only reached consistently with the proxy of the 
shadow economy and sometimes with the electricity difference method.  The efficiency of the 
judicial system, as proxied by our two different variables, is almost invariably related with lower 
levels of money laundering activities across countries.  The results are always significant for the 
index of court formalism at 1 percent levels, and in four out of six regressions for the case of the 
length of check collection.  The estimated coefficients predict that a two-standard deviation 
increase in the efficiency of the legal system, as proxied by court formalism  (roughly the 
distance between Kazakhstan and the United States) is associated with a decrease of money 
laundering of 12.8 percent in the currency demand method, a 14.1 percent fall in the electricity   20  
differences method, a 10.85 percent decrease in the shadow economy method, a 1.16 
improvement in the tax evasion measure, and a rise of 0.87 and 0.71 in the indices of Money 
Laundering via banks and non-bank institutions, respectively.  Similarly, a two-standard 
deviation increase in the duration of check collection (roughly the distance between Botswana 
and the United States) is also associated with a statistically significant increase in money 
laundering of 3.06 percent for the shadow economy and an increase in the tax evasion index of 
0.60 points, and 0.46 and 0.52 points for the money laundering through banks and non-bank 
institutions, respectively.  All of these numbers point to the large effects of the quality of 
enforcement on controlling money laundering.  Perhaps most interestingly, anti-money 
laundering regulation also has a strong statistically significant impact on money laundering 
activities.  The first two panels use the anti-money laundering indices based on the information 
provided by the U.S. State Department.  Panel A uses the average of the annual index of 
regulation for the years 1996-2000, while Panel B uses the whole series of data spanning from 
1996 to 2004.  We separated the periods for two reasons.  First, we try to isolate the effects of the 
September 11, 2001 attacks on the regulation of money-laundering and other criminal activities 
in the U.S. and other nations.  Second, since some of our dependent variables end in 2000, we 
wanted to look at the regulation up to that period.  The results in Tables 8 and 9 show that this 
does not matter much.  In both cases, the anti-money laundering regulation index is strongly 
significant, but the economic impact is higher for the 1996-2004 index.  The estimated 
coefficients predict that a two-standard deviation increase in the anti-money laundering 
regulation index for 1996 to 2004 (roughly the distance between Kenya and the U.S.) is 
associated with a decrease in money laundering of 10 percent in the currency demand method, an 
8 percent decline with the electricity differences method, a 6.8 percent decrease with the shadow 
economy method, a 0.80 improvement in the tax evasion measure, and an increase of 0.56 and 
0.48 in the indices of Money Laundering via banks and non-bank institutions, respectively.  The 
economic magnitude of these results is very similar if we use the money laundering regulation 
index developed using U.S. State Department information department for the sub-period 1996-
2000.   
  One of the reasons for developing two alternative measures of money regulation from 
different sources is to provide some robustness check on our results.  Our aggregate index on 
money-laundering regulation measuring the convergence of legislation to FATF shows that the   21  
impact of regulation is still present, with strong significance.  The estimated coefficients predict 
that a two-standard deviation increase in the anti-money laundering regulation FATF 
convergence index in 2004 (roughly the distance between Ecuador and the U.S.) is associated 
with a decrease of money laundering of 10 percent in the currency demand method, a 12 percent  
fall with the electricity differences method, a 5.5 decrease with the shadow economy method, a 
0.73 improvement in the tax evasion measure, and a  rise of 0.74 and 0.66 in the indices of 
Money Laundering via banks and non-bank institutions, respectively. 
 
4.2 Robustness  
As a first robustness check, we attempt to ensure that the econometric specification of these 
regressions did not materially impact the results of the paper.  Given the nature of the data for 
some of our measures of money laundering, Tables 10 and 11 use a Tobit specification as an 
alternative.  There are very small changes in economic magnitudes, but the statistical 
significance of our results on the impact of anti-money laundering regulation and enforcement 
are preserved and sometimes improved. 
  A second and possibly more important issue is that of endogeneity: are anti-money 
laundering regulations endogenous?  It is possible that countries adopt better anti-money 
laundering standards and regulations are those where the problems are smaller to begin with, or 
where the fight against crime has produced success.  We can partially address this problem using 
instrumental variables.  There are several instruments that we can use to determine the 
exogenous component of anti-money laundering regulation, and these variables have been 
developed and used in other contexts for the regulation of financial and labor markets, among 
other areas (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; Djankov et al., 2002; and Botero et al., 2004).   
In order to address endogeneity concerns, we need reasonably exogenous sources of 
variation linked to the legal, political or economic characteristics of nations.  There are four sets 
of instruments we use to proxy for deeper economic, legal, political and social characteristics of 
countries that may explain the variation of regulation.  The first instrument proxies for the 
economic theories of institutions.  Under these theories, as economic wealth expands, better 
institutions become affordable.  Latitude is a good proxy for some of the exogenous reasons that 
allow countries to grow richer; in locations closer to the equator, high rates of infectious disease 
lead to lower productivity and efficiency, which in turn affects rates of investment and growth   22  
over time.  The second  set of instrument was developed by La Porta et al. (1997 and 1998) and 
pertains to countries’ legal origin. Under the legal theory, a country’s approach to regulation is 
shaped by its legal tradition, and the majority of countries  in the world have inherited their basic 
legal structure from their conquerors or colonizers. The laws of different colonizers belong to 
different legal traditions which, in broad terms, fall into common law or civil law traditions with  
very different strategies toward the social control of business (La Porta, et. al., 1999, and 
Djankov et al., 2003).   
The essence of political theories of institutions is that political divergence in societies, 
emerging from social, class, or ethnic interests, impacts the choice of regulation and institutions, 
as those in power try to stay in power and transfer resources to themselves and away from other 
groups.  Following this theory, we use ethno-linguistic fractionalization in a country as an 
instrument (La Porta et al., 1999). 
Finally, our fourth set of instruments try to capture more explicitly the cultural aspects 
that could drive regulation and government policies. According to cultural theories (Weber, 
1958; Banfield, 1958; Putnam, 1993; and Landes 1998), societies hold beliefs that can shape 
institutions.  Societies’ distrust and intolerance affect regulation and legislation. Following the 
approach of other papers, we use as a set of instruments the percentage of the population in 1980 
that belonged to the three largest religions in the world: Catholics, Muslims and Protestants, with 
the omitted variable lumping all other religions and non-religious populations.  As an alternative 
we have also used the same variables but for the 1900, the results do not change. 
Panels A.2, B.2 and C.2 of Tables 12 and 13 shows the results of the first-stage 
regressions.  There are four main results from these tables, with respect to the excluded 
instruments.  First, latitude is an important determinant of anti-money laundering regulation, as  
countries farther away from the equator have higher levels of regulation.  Second, in about half 
of the specifications,  English Common Law countries also show statistically significantly higher 
levels of anti-money laundering regulation.  Third, countries with higher percentages of Catholic 
populations also exhibit higher levels of anti-money laundering regulatory measures, while in a 
few of the specifications, predominantly Muslim nations show lower levels.  Finally, a higher 
level of ethno-linguistic fractionalization in a country explains lower levels of anti-money 
laundering regulation, but this result is significant in only a third of the specifications.    23  
Most importantly, the results of the first-stage regressions show that there are exogenous 
sources that partly determine the level of anti-money laundering regulations.  The F-statistic on 
the excluded instruments is between 7 and 17, according to the specification.  The fact that there 
is exogenous variation in regulation alleviates the concerns of endogeneity problems that could 
have been thought to be the drivers of the results in the previous sections. 
Panels A.1, B.1 and C.1 of Tables 12 and 13 show the second-stage regressions with the 
instrumental variables results.  Our previous simple OLS and Tobit results survive.  The 
magnitudes of the coefficients has changed, but the three aggregate anti-money laundering 
regulation variables are still strong predictors of the amount and extent of money laundering 
activities.  The estimated coefficients predict that a two-standard deviation increase in the anti-
money laundering regulation index for 1996 to 2004 (roughly the distance between Kenya and 
the United States) is associated with an decrease in money laundering of 9 percent in the 
currency demand method, an 11 percent fall with the electricity differences method, a 7.4 percent 
decrease with the shadow economy method, a 1.01 improvement in the tax evasion measure, and 
a  rise of 0.90 and 0.78 in the indices of Money Laundering via banks and non-bank institutions, 
respectively.  Using our alternative aggregate index of FATF convergence produces similar 
results.
19   
  The results in Tables 8 through 13 show that there is a large and statistically significant 
impact of anti-money laundering regulation across countries and that this impact is different than 
and in addition to the impact of better enforcement.  In the following section we try to 
understand which aspects of anti-money laundering regulation work better and why.   
 
5.  What Aspects of Money Laundering Regulation Work Better? 
 
As explained above, if money laundering regulation works, we may want to explore deeper and 
ask which aspects of the law work better.  Section 1 of the paper spelled out the groups of 
theories about the impact of regulation applied to money laundering in this case.  There are 
basically two non-exclusive views of what works.  The first view assigns a large role to 
prevention through standardized disclosures and tougher liability standards for all participants in 
                                                           
19 We have also produced, but not included in the paper, a similar set of instrumental variables regressions for the 
Tobit specifications of Tables 10 and 11.  Results are very similar.    24  
the process, while the second view focuses on greater enforcement powers.
20  Tables 14 and 15  
run the same type of regressions as in the previous sections but we now include the individual 
sub-indices of the indices we developed based on 1996-2004 U.S. State Department information 
and the EstandardsForum 2004 information.  These tables show the basic OLS specifications, 
mimicking those in Table 8, which control for the log of GNP and the log of the total duration of 
the check collection through the courts.
21   
The results of Panel A of Tables 14 and 15 for the regulation of financial intermediaries 
show a significant impact of this indicator in four out of the six money laundering measures.  In 
Table 14, the estimated coefficients predict that a two-standard deviation increase in the financial 
system regulation sub index for 1996 to 2004 (roughly the distance between Pakistan and the 
United States ) is associated with a decrease in money laundering of 5 percent in the currency 
demand method,  a 4.8 percent decrease with the shadow economy method, a 0.59 improvement 
in the tax evasion measure, and a rise of 0.47 in the index of Money Laundering via banks.  
Panel A of Table 15 shows that when using the FATF convergence information for financial 
regulation, the economic magnitude of these results is more than 40 percent higher in most cases, 
with significant impacts on money laundering reduction in five out of the six regressions.   
Panel B of Tables 14 and 15 shows even stronger results for the sub-index of 
criminalization.  The economic impact of the criminalization sub-index is similar to that of the 
financial regulation sub-index, but the statistical significance is always higher at 1 percent levels 
in nine out of the 12 regressions. In Table 14, the estimated coefficients predict that a two-
standard deviation increase in this sub index for the 1996-2004 period (roughly the distance 
between Uganda and the United States) is associated with a decrease in money laundering of 10 
percent in the currency demand method, a 12 percent decline with the electricity differences 
method, an 8.8 percent decrease with the shadow economy method, a 1.1 improvement in the tax 
evasion measure, and an increase of 0.93 and 0.89 in the indices of Money Laundering via banks 
and non-bank institutions, respectively.  Panel B of Table 15 shows very similar results in terms 
of statistical significance, but the economic impact is between 20 and 30 percent higher. 
                                                           
20 Whereas these are rough characterizations, the available evidence in this paper already allows us to say something 
about these issues, suggesting areas that could be pursued further. 
21 The results do not significantly change when we use all the alternative specifications that we have shown in 
Section 5 (i.e., using the sub period of 1996-200 data for the US State Department information, controlling for other 
indices of enforcement, tobit specifications, and instrumental variables).  We do not show these tables for reasons of 
space, but the results are available from the authors.   25  
Panels C of Tables 14 and 15 deal with the impact of international cooperation measures.  
The results are in general weaker than for the criminalization and financial regulations sub- 
indices.  The coefficients are statistically significant in only two of the six measures using the 
U.S. State Department information, and only reach 10 percent significance levels in several of 
the specifications of the FATF sub-index.  Finally, Panel D of Table 15 shows the results of the 
variable on authorities from the index on FATF convergence.  The results show a sizeable and 
statistically significant impact in most regressions.   
To summarize, most aspects of regulation matter, criminalization and financial regulation  
most of all.  The magnitudes differ, but since we find a role for each of these sub-indices it is 
hard to say at first glance that some particular area of regulation of anti-money laundering is 
ineffective. We are currently gathering more data about specific features in several of these areas 
in the hope of obtaining more refined measures that would allow us to take a second look and tell 
these stories apart.   
As a final approach to try to disentangle or rank the effects of various groups of 
measures, Table 16 shows a horse race between the three sub-indices of financial system 
regulation, criminalization and international cooperation, for each of our two data sources.  For 
reasons of space, we show only the simple OLS regressions.  The table shows that the index of 
criminalization comes in strongly significant in most specifications, to the detriment of the sub- 
indices of financial system and international cooperation.  This seems to suggest that the 
criminalization of feeder activities and tougher confiscation of proceeds raise the cost to 
criminals and curtail money laundering.  We should also point out that the current measures that 
we have for the prevention theory, mainly those of financial system regulations, are missing the 
key ingredient of the liability of intermediaries, which could be thought of as an important factor.  
We believe that, as in the case of securities markets regulation, if financial intermediaries were to 
be liable, though probably only for negligence, they would act as a monitoring arm of the 
authorities and thus improve the detection of money laundering.  
We should take these results with some caution, however, since Table 7 has shown that 
the sub-indices are correlated.  Multicollinearity between the three sub-indices may be of 
concern, as the correlation of these variables is between 0.61 and 0.96. 
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These results point to the high impact of criminalization and confiscation features on the 
regulation of money laundering.  We should put these results in the context of the results 




Money laundering has jumped high on the political agenda as a result of the increasing attention 
paid to the finances of drug trafficking and terrorism.  In this paper, we have taken an empirical 
look at the determinants of money laundering and its regulation in over 80 countries using 
multiple sources.   
Our results show that tougher money laundering regulation has an impact on reducing 
money laundering and the extent of its feeder activities, controlling for other country 
characteristics, legal enforcement and potential endogeneity.  Whereas each data source may be 
criticized by itself, the fact that the findings we obtain all point in the same direction, regardless 
of the data used, gives credence to our findings. In fact, the evidence provided here also suggests 
a role for various aspects of money laundering regulation, such as include disclosure from 
financial institutions, that make enforcement easier.  In particular, measures that criminalize 
feeding activities and improve confiscation tend to matter more than other features of legislation, 
although they are not the only ones that matter. In order to better understand the specific aspects 
of the regulation that matter within these categories we are currently collecting more data to test 
more refined versions of the theories. 
The relevance of historical factors in explaining the variation of money laundering 
regulation across countries sheds light on theories of institutions and provides room for further 
action in various jurisdictions.  In contrast to those who are skeptical of the usefulness of anti-
money laundering regulation, our data consistently show a positive impact of several of its 
features and their enforcement. 
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Money laundering calculation using the method developed by Gutman (1977). His approach assumes that shadow (or hidden) 
transactions are undertaken in the form of cash payments, so as to leave no observable traces for the authorities. An increase in the size 
of the shadow economy will therefore increase the demand for currency. To isolate the resulting “excess” demand for currency, an 
equation for currency demand is econometrically estimated over time. All conventional possible factors, such as the development of 
income, payment habits, interest rates, and so on, are controlled for. Additionally, such variables as the directand indirect tax burden, 
government regulation and the complexity of the tax system, which are assumed to be the major factors causing people to work in the 
shadow economy, are included in the estimation equation. Any “excess” increase in currency, or the amount unexplained by the 
conventional or normal factors  is then attributed to the rising tax burden and the other reasons leading people to work in the shadow 
economy. To calculate this index, we used annual data on Currency Holdings and Demand deposits and we have computed two time 




To measure overall (official and unofficial) economic activity in an economy, Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) assume that electric-
power consumption is regarded as the single best physical indicator of overall (or official plus unofficial) economic activity. Overall 
economic activity and electricity consumption have been empirically observed throughout the world to move in lockstep with an 
electricity to GDP elasticity usually close to one. This means, that the growth of total electricity consumption is an indicator for growth 
of overall (official and unofficial) GDP. By having this proxy measurement for the overall economy and then subtracting from this 
overall measure the estimates of official GDP, Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) derive an estimate of unofficial GDP. To estimate this 
index, we use the data on total electricity consumption from the World Bank, 2004. Data on real (official) gross domestic product, 
measured as the nominal GDP deflated by the implicit gross domestic product deflator, was obtained from the International Monetary 
Fund (2003). The assumptions here are that the GDP/electricity elasticity equals one. 
Shadow economy   This method considers multiple causes and multiple indicators of the shadow economy and follows Aigner, Scheneider, and Ghosh 
(1988). A factor-analytic approach is used to measure the shadow economy as an unobserved variable over time. The unknown 
coefficients are estimated using structural equations within which the unobserved variable cannot be measured directly. This dynamic 
multiple-indicators multiple-causes (DYMIMIC) consists of two parts, with the measurement linking the unobserved variables to 
observed indicators. Thus, these structural equations specify causal relationship among the unobserved variables, in this case, the 
shadow economy. This is assumed to be influenced by a set of indicators for its size, thus capturing its structural dependence on 
variables that may be useful in predicting its movement and size in the future.  In fact, there is a large body of literature on the possible 
causes and indicators of the shadow economy such as the development of the production market, the development of the labor market, 
monetary indicators, burden of regulation, taxation, and others. 
Tax Evasion  This variable was taken from the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002, in which the authors use a 
survey of managers. The question regarding to tax evasion was formulated as follows: “Tax evasion in your country is . . .” and it 
valued with discrete values from 1 to 7, where 1=rampant and 7=minimal. 
ML via banks   This variable was taken from the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2003, in which they use a survey to 
managers. The question regarding to money laundering through banks was formulated as follows: “Money laundering through the 
banking system in your country is...” and it valued with discrete values from 1 to 7, where 1=pervasive and 7=extremely rare. 
ML non-banks   This variable was taken from the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2003, in which they use a survey to 
managers. The question regarding to money laundering through banks was formulated as follows: “Money laundering through non-
bank channels in your country is . . .” and it valued with discrete values from 1 to 7, where 1=pervasive and 7=extremely rare.   32  
 




Financial system money laundry index. This is calculated as the average four variables: (i) Record Large Transactions which takes the 
value of one when, by law or regulation, banks are required to maintain records of large transactions in currency or other monetary 
instruments and zero otherwise; (ii) Maintain Records Over Time, which takes the value of one when, by law or regulation, banks are 
required to keep records, especially of large or unusual transactions, for a specified period of time, e.g., five years. and zero otherwise; 
(iii) Report Suspicious Transactions, which takes the value of one when, by law or regulation, banks are required to record and report 
suspicious or unusual transactions to designated authorities, and zero otherwise; and (iv) Non-Bank Financial Institutions, which takes 
the value of one when, by law or regulation, the jurisdiction requires non-bank financial institutions to meet the same customer 
identification standards and adhere to the same reporting requirements that it imposes on banks, and zero otherwise. Source: Own 
elaboration based on data provided by the US State Department for the periods 1996-2000 and 1996-2004. 
Criminalization 
(State Dept.)  
Criminalizing of money laundry index. This index is calculated as the average of two variables: (i) Criminalized Drug Money 
Laundering, which takes the value of one when the jurisdiction has enacted laws criminalizing the offense of money laundering related 
to drug trafficking and zero otherwise; and (ii) Criminalized Beyond Drugs, which takes the value of one when the jurisdiction has 
extended anti-money laundering statutes and regulations to include no drug-related money laundering and zero otherwise. Source: 




International cooperation money laundry index. This index is calculated as the average of six variables: (i) Arrangements for Asset 
Sharing, which takes the value of one when, by law, regulation or bilateral agreement, the jurisdiction permits sharing of seized assets 
with third party jurisdictions which assisted in the conduct of the underlying investigation and zero otherwise; (ii) Cooperates 
w/International Law Enforcement, which takes the value of one when, by law or regulation, banks are permitted/required to cooperate 
with authorized investigations involving or initiated by third party jurisdictions, including sharing of records or other financial data, 
and zero otherwise; (iii) International Transportation of Currency, which takes the value of one when, by law or regulation, the 
jurisdiction, in cooperation with banks, controls or monitors the flow of currency and monetary instruments crossing its borders, and 
zero otherwise; (iv) Mutual Legal Assistance, which takes the value of one when, by law or through treaty, the jurisdiction has agreed 
to provide and receive mutual legal assistance, including the sharing of records and data, and zero otherwise; (v) Disclosure Protection 
Safe Harbor, which takes the value of one when, by law, the jurisdiction provides a “safe harbor” defense to banks or other financial 
institutions and their employees who provide otherwise confidential banking data to authorities in pursuit of authorized investigations, 
and zero otherwise; and (vi) States Parties to 1988 UN Drug Convention, which takes the value of one when, as of December 31, 2001, 
a party to the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, or a territorial 
entity to which the application of the Convention has been extended by a party to the Convention, and zero otherwise. Source: Own 
calculations based on data provided by the US State Department for the periods 1996-2000 and 1996-2004. 
ML regulation (State 
Dept. indices).  
Average of the three sub-indices above. Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the US State Department for the 




This index is the average of two variables:  (i) Identification rules, which measures the degree to which the authorities requires 
customers identification and record keeping in order to prevent money laundering; and (ii) Financial institutions rules, which ties to 
approximate to the degree in which the diligence to financial institutions has increased in the country. Each of the two variables is 
assigned values according to the degree of compliance of the jurisdiction. Each variable takes the following values: 0 (no compliance); 
0.25 (intent declared); 0.5 (enacted); 0.75 (compliance in progress); and 1 (full compliance). The data is for the year 2005. Source: 
Authors’ calculations based on information from http://www.estandardsforum.com/ 
Criminalization 
(FATF Convergence) 
This index is the average of two variables: (i) Criminalization, which measures the degree in which money laundering is considered as 
a criminal offence; and (ii) Confiscation, which measures the degree in which the authorities take provisional measures and 
confiscation regarding to money laundering. Each of the two variables is assigned values according to the degree of compliance of the 
jurisdiction. Each variable takes the following values: 0 (no compliance); 0.25 (intent declared); 0.5 (enacted); 0.75 (compliance in 
progress); and 1 (full compliance). The data is for the year 2005. 




This index is the average of two variables: (i) International information exchange, which measures the degree in which the country has 
international cooperation and exchange of information; and (ii) International confiscation, which depends on the degree in which the 
country has international cooperation/confiscation or mutual assistance on extradition. Each of the two variables is assigned values 
according to the degree of compliance of the jurisdiction. Each variable takes the following values: 0 (no compliance); 0.25 (intent 
declared); 0.5 (enacted); 0.75 (compliance in progress); and 1 (full compliance). The data is for the year 2005. Source: Authors’ 




Index developed by the Estandards Forum, based on an 83-country sample. Depending on the implementation and role of the 
regulatory and other administrative authorities regarding to money laundering, This variable is assigned values according to the degree 
of compliance of the jurisdiction., taking the following values: 0 (no compliance); 0.25 (intent declared); 0.5 (enacted); 0.75 
(compliance in progress); and 1 (full compliance). The data is for the year 2005.  Source: Authors’ calculations based on information 
from http://www.estandardsforum.com/ 
ML regulation FATF 
convergence index 
This variable is a simple average of the preceding four sub-indices above. Source: Authors’ calculations based on information from 
http://www.estandardsforum.com/   33  
 
Other variables (Controls and instruments) 
Log GDP  Logarithm of gross domestic product in US dollars for 2000. Source: World Development Indicators. 
Latitude 
 
The absolute value of the latitude of the country, scaled to take values between 0 and 1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency (1996). 
Court formalism   The index measures substantive and procedural statutory intervention in judicial cases at lower-level civil trial courts, and is formed by 
adding up the following indices: (i) professionals vs. laymen, (ii) written vs. oral elements, (iii) legal justification, (iv) statutory 
regulation of evidence, (v) control of superior review, (vi) engagement formalities, and (vii) independent procedural actions. The index 
ranges from 0 to 7, where 7 mean a higher level of control or intervention in the judicial process. Source: Djankov et al. (2003). 
Log (Duration check 
collection) 
The total estimated duration in calendar days of the procedure under the factual and procedural assumptions provided. It equals the 
sum of: (i) duration until completion of service of process, (ii) duration of trial, and (iii) duration of enforcement. Source: Djankov et 
al. (2003). 
Common law  Identifies the legal origin of the law or commercial code of each country. Equal 1 of the origin is English common law and zero 
otherwise. Source: La Porta et al. (1999) 
Log settler mortality  Log of the mortality rate faced by European settlers at the time of colonization. Source: Acemoglu et al. (2001). 
Population density in 
1500 





Average value of five different indices of ethno linguistic fractionalization. Its value ranges from 0 to 1. The five component indices 
are: (1) index of ethno linguistic fractionalization in 1960, which measures the probability that two randomly selected people from a 
given country will not belong to the same ethno linguistic group (the index is based on the number and size of population groups as 
distinguished by their ethnic and linguistic status); (2) and (3) probability of two randomly selected individuals speaking different 
languages; (4) percent of the population not speaking the official language; and (5) percent of the population not speaking the most 
widely used language. Source: Easterly and Levine (1997). 
% Catholics  Identifies the % of the population of each country that belonged to Catholic religion in 1980. For countries of recent formation, the 
data is available for 1990-95. The numbers are in percent (0-100). Sources: La Porta et. al. (1999) 
% Muslim  Identifies the % of the population of each country that belonged to Muslim religion in 1980. For countries of recent formation, the data 
is available for 1990-95. The numbers are in percent (0-100). Sources: La Porta et. al. (1999) 
% Protestant  Identifies the % of the population of each country that belonged to Protestant religion in 1980. For countries of recent formation, the 
data is available for 1990-95. The numbers are in percent (0-100). Sources: La Porta et. al. (1999) 
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Africa            
Mean  -  0.33  39.61 3.18 5.04  4.26 
Median  -  0.35  38.40 3.05 5.05  4.05 
Asia and Oceania           
Mean  0.20  0.26  30.18 3.74 4.81  4.20 
Median  0.13  0.29  29.30 3.40 4.90  4.30 
Middle East            
Mean  0.19  0.20  23.81 3.10 4.80  4.75 
Median  0.16  0.20  20.65 3.60 4.80  4.75 
Europe and North America            
Mean  0.15  0.16  24.06 3.68 5.09  4.38 
Median  0.13  0.12  22.60 3.60 5.30  4.40 
Latin America            
Mean  0.24  0.44  42.50 2.82 3.94  3.13 
Median  0.22  0.42  39.45 2.60 3.85  3.10 
                    
Sample average  0.19  0.26  31.32 3.41 4.71  4.01 
Sample median  0.15  0.23  32.10 3.10 4.70  3.95 
Panel B: Tests of means (t-statistics) 
Latin Am. vs. Africa  -  -1.55  -0.73  0.81  3.86***  3.89*** 
Latina Am. vs. A&O  -0.97  -3.88***  -2.63***  2.55**  3.35***  3.79*** 
Latin Am. vs. Middle East  -0.78  -2.39**  -3.63***  0.59  1.78*  3.50*** 
Latin Am. vs. Europe and North Am.  -1.76*  -8.30***  -5.23***  3.32*** 4.97***  4.94*** 
Africa vs. A&O  -  1.15  2.35**  -0.77  0.63  0.15 
Africa vs. Middle East  -  1.58  4.72***  0.10  0.45  -0.78 
Africa vs. Europe and North Am.  -  4.28***  5.36***  -0.99  -0.16  -0.31 
A&O vs. Middle East  0.03  0.65  1.16  0.77  0.01  -0.71 
A&O vs. Europe and North Am.  0.97  3.28***  1.82*  0.17  -1.06  -0.58 
Middle East vs. Europe and North 
Am. 0.48  0.70  -0.06  -1.01  -0.46  0.51 
Panel C: Tests of medians (Pearson chi2) 
Latin Am. vs. Africa  -  2.04  0.75  1.43  7.60***  7.60*** 
Latina Am. vs. A&O  1.85  4.37**  1.67  5.46**  7.69***  6.06** 
Latin Am. vs. Middle East  0.44  2.29  6.75*** 0.39  2.64  2.20 
Latin Am. vs. Europe and North Am.  4.39**  21.54***  13.50*** 9.92*** 15.61***  15.61*** 
Africa vs. A&O  -  2.56  1.17  1.01  0.17  0.52 
Africa vs. Middle East  -  2.10  10.86*** 1.22  2.50  2.50 
Africa vs. Europe and North Am.  -  2.39  21.22*** 1.14  0.04  0.29 
A&O vs. Middle East  3.85**  2.20  0.67  0.67  1.63  2.48 
A&O vs. Europe and North Am.  0.00  3.18*  1.17  0.65  2.87*  0.22 
Middle East vs. Europe and North Am.  0.48  2.15  0.63  0.19  1.35  0.11 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%         
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Table 3. Money Laundering Measures by Size of Economy 














Bottom 25 percentile of GNP          
Mean  0.27 0.40 39.90 3.23  4.36  3.69 
Median  0.26 0.46 39.80 3.30  4.00  3.40 
Middle 50 percentile of GNP                    
Mean  0.21 0.29 33.38 3.22  4.55  3.80 
Median  0.16 0.32 33.85 3.00  4.50  3.60 
Top 25 percentile of GNP 
       
Mean  0.14 0.17 20.44 3.75  5.15  4.50 
Median  0.11 0.13 18.30 3.65  5.30  4.70 
            
Sample average 
0.19 0.26 31.32 3.40  4.71  4.00 
Sample median  0.15 0.23 32.10 3.10  4.70  3.90 
Panel B: Tests of means (t-statistics) 
            
Middle 50 vs. Top 25 percentile  1.78*  3.48***  4.57***  -1.82*  -2.66**  -2.79*** 
Bottom 25 vs. Top 25 percentile  2.00*  4.09***  6.19***  -1.32  -2.62**  -2.32** 
Bottom 25 vs. Middle 50 percentile  0.94  1.67  1.99*  0.02  -0.67  -0.35 
Panel C: Tests of medians (Pearson chi2) 
Middle 50 vs. Top 25 percentile  5.37**  10.00*** 14.97***  3.67*  8.61***  10.55*** 
Bottom 25 vs. Top 25 percentile  4.73**  5.04**  26.21***  3.18*  4.07**  4.07** 
Bottom 25 vs. Middle 50 percentile  4.62**  1.71  3.60  0.46  0.29  0.14 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%         
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0.3859       Electricity differences   
0.0036      
         
0.4912 0.8026     Shadow economy  
0.0002 0.0000    
         
-0.3903 -0.5582 -0.6265   Tax Evasion 
0.0061 0.0000 0.0000  
         
-0.5766 -0.6139 -0.6533 0.788   ML via banks  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
         
-0.49 -0.5904 -0.6475 0.7933 0.9325 ML non-banks  
0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table 5. Measuring Regulation of Money Laundering 
Panel A: Regulation of money laundering measures 
 
Financial syst. reg. 






(State Dept.)  
96-04 
ML regulation (State 
Dept.) 
 96-04 
ML regulation (State 
Dept.)  
96-00 
Bottom 25 percentile of GNP         
Mongolia 0.00  0.00  0.13  0.04  0.00 
Kyrgyzstan 0.06  0.00  0.15  0.07  0.03 
Armenia 0.17  0.33  0.26  0.25  0.03 
Georgia 0.17  0.33  0.22  0.24  0.04 
Zambia 0.25  0.75  0.33  0.44  0.22 
Namibia 0.50  0.20  0.10  0.27  0.00 
Mozambique 0.57  0.71  0.45  0.58  0.15 
Albania 0.39  0.78  0.24  0.47  0.20 
Nicaragua 0.54  0.50  0.48  0.50  0.34 
Haiti 0.57  0.57  0.33 0.49 0.06 
Mauritius 0.63  0.83 0.58 0.68 0.43 
Bosnia & Herzegovina  0.42  0.58  0.44  0.48  0.43 
Ghana 0.58  1.00  0.69  0.76  0.75 
Botswana 0.60  0.80  0.50  0.63  0.36 
Estonia 0.44  0.56  0.48  0.49  0.19 
Nepal 0.28  0.00  0.37  0.22  0.22 
Uganda 0.00  0.40  0.23  0.21  0.06 
Honduras 0.96  0.71  0.81  0.83  0.73 
Ethiopia 0.46  0.00  0.17  0.21  0.06 
Paraguay 0.97  0.89  0.63  0.83  0.78 
Latvia 0.67  0.72  0.52  0.64  0.43 
Jamaica 0.72  0.72  0.76  0.73  0.53 
Trinidad & Tobago  0.92  0.78  0.85  0.85  0.73 
Bolivia 0.47  0.78  0.31  0.52  0.40 
Iceland 0.88  1.00  0.67  0.85  0.81 
Jordan 0.38  0.50  0.44  0.44  0.11 
Yugoslavia (former before split) 0.00  0.00  0.04 0.01 0.00 
Yugoslavia (former before split) 0.00  0.00  0.04 0.01 0.00 
Mean 0.45  0.52  0.40  0.46  0.29 
Median 0.47  0.58  0.41  0.49  0.21 
Middle 50 percentile of GNP        
Cyprus 0.97  0.94  0.83  0.92  0.88 
Cameroon 0.00  0.13  0.13  0.08  0.17 
Tanzania 0.60  0.50  0.50  0.53  0.39 
Kenya 0.36  0.50  0.50  0.45  0.35 
Cote D'Ivoire  0.67  1.00  0.63  0.77  0.70 
Lithuania 0.69  0.67  0.65  0.67  0.45 
Panama 0.94  0.78  0.93  0.88  0.79 
Bulgaria 0.75  0.67  0.63  0.68  0.48 
Belarus 0.64  0.43  0.48  0.52  0.22 
El Salvador  0.93  0.86  0.74  0.84  0.70 
Uzbekistan 0.36  0.67  0.41  0.48  0.27 
Ecuador 0.92  0.67  0.50  0.69  0.76 
Costa Rica  0.89  0.67  0.76  0.77  0.62 
Sri Lanka  0.00  0.11  0.30  0.14  0.14 
Lebanon 0.42  0.56  0.33  0.44  0.12 
Syria 0.05  0.20  0.40  0.22  0.17 
Kazakhstan 0.29  0.64  0.48  0.47  0.45 
Croatia 0.75  0.78  0.67  0.73  0.53 
Slovenia 1.00  1.00  0.81  0.94  0.93 
Guatemala 0.44  0.50  0.48  0.48  0.10 
Tunisia 0.33  0.33  0.39  0.35   
Luxembourg 1.00  0.83  0.83  0.89  0.84 
Dominican Republic  1.00  0.67  0.76  0.81  0.72 
Uruguay 0.78  0.72  0.48  0.66  0.48 
Slovakia 0.67  0.83  0.44  0.65  0.43   38  
Vietnam 0.40  1.00  0.47  0.62  0.61 
Morocco 0.25  0.06  0.31  0.21  0.14 
Romania 0.67  0.67  0.37  0.57  0.36 
Nigeria 0.83  0.78  0.76  0.79  0.72 
Hungary 1.00  1.00  0.78  0.93  0.91 
Bangladesh 0.25  0.50  0.36  0.37  0.11 
Peru 0.89  0.78  0.61  0.76  0.63 
Algeria 0.11  0.00  0.36  0.15  0.09 
Czech Republic  0.86  0.89 0.74 0.83 0.74 
New Zealand  0.72  1.00  0.81  0.84  0.69 
United Arab Emirates  0.50  0.33  0.52  0.45  0.14 
Pakistan 0.36  0.50  0.43  0.43  0.42 
Chile 0.67  0.67  0.46  0.60  0.44 
Philippines 0.53  0.44  0.67  0.55  0.23 
Colombia 0.83  1.00  0.70  0.85  0.81 
Malaysia 0.50  0.83  0.67  0.67  0.31 
Singapore 1.00  0.83  0.67  0.83  0.76 
Ireland 1.00  1.00  0.83  0.94  0.94 
Iran 0.00  0.00  0.33  0.11  0.11 
Egypt 0.31  0.33  0.61  0.42  0.12 
Portugal 0.94  0.89  0.83  0.89  0.83 
Greece 1.00  1.00  0.65 0.88 0.83 
Israel 0.47  0.56  0.70  0.58  0.28 
Finland 1.00  1.00  0.83  0.94  0.94 
Venezuela 1.00  0.50  0.80  0.77  0.76 
Thailand 0.58  0.67  0.56  0.60  0.34 
South Africa  0.50  0.81  0.58  0.63  0.40 
Indonesia 0.29  0.43  0.48  0.40  0.09 
Mean 0.62  0.64  0.58  0.62  0.49 
Median 0.67  0.67  0.61  0.65  0.45 
Bottom 25 percentile of GNP       
Denmark 1.00  1.00  0.76  0.92  0.90 
Hong Kong  0.92  1.00  0.83  0.92  0.89 
Poland 0.86  1.00  0.74  0.87  0.83 
Norway 0.78  0.89  0.78  0.81  0.67 
Saudi Arabia  0.75  1.00  0.50  0.75  0.69 
Austria 1.00  1.00  0.72  0.91  0.89 
Turkey 0.89  0.89  0.67  0.81  0.73 
Belgium 1.00  1.00  0.83  0.94  0.94 
Sweden 0.97  0.94  0.63  0.84  0.80 
Switzerland 0.97  1.00  0.69  0.89  0.88 
Russia 0.44  0.78  0.43  0.55  0.30 
Netherlands 1.00  1.00  0.83  0.94  0.94 
Australia 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
India 0.78  0.50  0.76  0.68  0.52 
Korea (Republic of)  0.33  0.50  0.46  0.43  0.13 
Spain 1.00  1.00  0.98  0.99  0.99 
Mexico 0.92  0.94  0.89  0.92  0.85 
Brazil 0.83  0.67  0.72  0.74  0.53 
Canada 0.93  1.00  0.95  0.96  0.91 
Italy 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
China (PRC)  0.33  0.78  0.48  0.53  0.37 
France 1.00  1.00  0.98  0.99  0.99 
United Kingdom  1.00  1.00  0.87  0.96  0.97 
Germany 0.94  1.00  0.76  0.90  0.88 
Japan 1.00  0.83  0.83  0.89  0.84 
United States  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Mean 0.87  0.91  0.77  0.85  0.79 
Median 0.96  1.00  0.77  0.63  0.51 
          
Sample average  0.64  0.68  0.58  0.90  0.88 
Sample median  0.67  0.75  0.61  0.67  0.48 
Panel B: Tests of means (t-statistics)  
         
Middle 50 vs Top 25 percentile  -3.74*** -4.53***  -4.43*** -4.64*** -4.58***   39  
Bottom 25 vs Top 25 percentile  -6.07*** -5.55***  -6.67*** -7.14*** -6.64*** 
Bottom 25 vs Middle 50 percentile  -2.40** -1.81*  -3.90*** -3.08*** -2.76*** 
Panel C: Tests of medians (Pearson Chi2) 
Middle 50 vs Top 25 percentile  11.77*** 15.29***  14.09*** 11.31*** 11.77*** 
Bottom 25 vs Top 25 percentile  29.67*** 21.37***  18.99*** 18.99*** 24.03*** 
Bottom 25 vs Middle 50 percentile 5.08** 0.07  5.78** 5.49** 5.09** 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
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Table 6. Measuring Regulation of Money Laundering (II) 
Panel A: Regulation of money laundering measures 
 












ML regulation FATF 
convergence index 
Bottom 25 percentile of GNP          
Ghana 0.13  0.38  0.75  0.00  0.31 
Estonia 1.00  0.88  0.75  0.75  0.84 
Honduras 0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50 
Latvia 0.75  0.38  0.75  0.75  0.66 
Bolivia 0.50  0.38  0.38  0.50  0.44 
Jordan 0.25  0.13  0.25  0.00  0.16 
Mean 0.52  0.44  0.42  0.56  0.48 
Median 0.50  0.38  0.50  0.63  0.47 
Middle 50 percentile of GNP                 
Cameroon 0.00  0.13  0.00  0.00  0.03 
Tanzania 0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25 
Kenya 0.25  0.38  0.25  0.25  0.28 
Cote D'Ivoire  0.38  0.25  0.25  0.00  0.22 
Lithuania 0.63  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.72 
Bulgaria 0.63  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.53 
Uzbekistan 0.25  0.38 0.25  0.25  0.28 
Ecuador 0.25  0.38  0.50  0.25  0.34 
Sri Lanka  0.13  0.25  0.13  0.00  0.13 
Lebanon 0.50  0.50  0.00  0.50  0.38 
Syria 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Kazakhstan 0.25  0.13  0.50  0.25  0.28 
Croatia 0.63  0.75  0.75  0.50  0.66 
Slovenia 0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75 
Guatemala 0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50 
Tunisia 0.38  0.25  0.13  0.25  0.25 
Luxembourg 0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75 
Dominican Republic  0.50  0.50  0.75  0.75  0.63 
Uruguay 0.50  0.63  0.50  0.50  0.53 
Slovakia 0.63  0.63  0.50  0.75  0.63 
Vietnam 0.00  0.25  0.25  0.00  0.13 
Morocco 0.00  0.00  0.38  0.00  0.09 
Romania 0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75 
Nigeria 0.50  0.38  0.38  0.50  0.44 
Hungary 0.75  0.50  0.63  0.75  0.66 
Bangladesh 0.38  0.13  0.00  0.25  0.19 
Peru 0.63  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.53 
Algeria 0.13  0.13  0.00  0.00  0.06 
Czech Republic  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75 
New Zealand  1.00  1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00 
United Arab Emirates  0.50  0.50  0.25  0.50  0.44 
Pakistan 0.38  0.13  0.25  0.25  0.25   41  
Chile 0.25  0.50  0.25  0.50  0.38 
Philippines 0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50 
Colombia 0.50  0.50  0.75  0.50  0.56 
Malaysia 0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50 
Singapore 0.63  0.75  0.63  0.75  0.69 
Ireland 0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75 
Iran 0.13  0.00  0.25  0.00  0.09 
Egypt 0.50  0.50  0.25  0.50  0.44 
Portugal 0.75  0.88  0.75  0.75  0.78 
Greece 0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75 
Israel 0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75 
Finland 0.63  0.88  0.63  0.75  0.72 
Venezuela 0.63  0.25  0.63  0.25  0.44 
Thailand 0.63  0.63  0.50  0.75  0.63 
South Africa  0.50  0.50  0.25  0.50  0.44 
Indonesia 0.25  0.38  0.00  0.00  0.16 
Mean 0.47  0.47  0.45  0.44  0.46 
Median 0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.47 
Top 25 percentile of GNP          
Denmark 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Hong Kong  0.63  0.63  0.75  0.50  0.63 
Poland 0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50 
Norway 1.00  0.88  0.75  0.75  0.84 
Saudi Arabia  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75 
Austria 0.75  1.00  0.75  0.75  0.81 
Turkey 0.63  0.50  0.50  0.75  0.59 
Belgium 0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75 
Sweden 0.75  0.88  0.75  0.75  0.78 
Switzerland 0.75  1.00  0.75  1.00  0.88 
Russia 0.50  0.63  0.63  0.75  0.63 
Netherlands 1.00  1.00  0.75  1.00  0.94 
Australia 0.75  0.88  0.75  0.75  0.78 
India 0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50 
Spain 0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75 
Mexico 0.75  0.63  0.75  0.75  0.72 
Brazil 0.75  0.63  0.75  0.75  0.72 
Canada 0.75  0.88  0.75  0.75  0.78 
Italy 1.00  0.88  0.88  1.00  0.94 
China (PRC)  0.50  0.25  0.38  0.50  0.41 
France 0.63  0.88  0.75  0.75  0.75 
United Kingdom  0.88  0.88  0.88  0.75  0.84 
Germany 0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75 
Japan 0.75  0.88  0.75  0.75  0.78 
United States  0.75  1.00  0.88  0.75  0.84 
Mean 0.74  0.77  0.75  0.73  0.75 
Median 0.75  0.88  0.75  0.75  0.75 
            42  
Sample average  0.56  0.56  0.54  0.54  0.55 
Sample median  0.63 0.50  0.50  0.63  0.63 
Panel B: Tests of means (t-statistics) 
Middle 50 vs Top 25 percentile  -5.03***  -5.10***  -4.95***  -4.92***  -5.37*** 
Bottom 25 vs Top 25 percentile  -2.51**  -3.55**  -3.79***  -2.33**  -3.51*** 
Bottom 25 vs Middle 50 percentile 0.47  -0.31  -0.25  1.04  0.25 
Panel C: Tests of medians (Pearson Chi2) 
Middle 50 vs Top 25 percentile  18.20***  11.37*** 4.99**  18.58***  14.56*** 
Bottom 25 vs Top 25 percentile  0.03  2.44  1.10  1.10  1.95 
Bottom 25 vs Middle 50 percentile 0.09  0.69  0.00  0.49  0.00 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%         43  
Table 7. Correlations among the Sub-Indices of Money Laundering Regulation (P-values below) 
  
Criminalization 

























                          
0.818            Financial syst. reg.  
(State Dept.) 96-04  0.000           
               
0.780 0.865          International Coop. 
(State Dept.) 96-04  0.000 0.000         
               
0.929 0.957 0.928        ML regulation  
(State Dept.) 96-04  0.000 0.000 0.000       
               
0.682 0.730 0.665 0.747      Criminalization  
(FATF Convergence)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000     
               
0.647 0.728 0.667 0.733 0.864    Financial syst. reg. 
(FATF Convergence)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
               
0.640 0.718 0.608 0.710 0.884 0.915   Admin. Authority  
(FATF Convergence)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
               
0.692 0.767 0.706 0.777 0.809 0.808 0.799  International Coop. 
(FATF Convergence)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
               
0.707 0.781 0.701 0.787 0.946 0.953 0.958 0.906  ML regulation FATF 
convergence index  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 8. OLS Regressions for Money Laundering Measures, Controlling by Log (Duration 
check collection) 







Tax Evasion  ML via 
banks 
ML non-banks 
-0.138 -0.145  -10.608 1.404  1.113  0.986  ML regulation (State 
Dept. indices) 96-00  (0.063)** (0.059)** (4.770)** (0.373)*** (0.405)***  (0.435)** 
           
-0.006 -0.028 -3.950  0.047  0.043  0.084  log GDP 2000   (0.014) (0.013)**  (0.800)*** (0.065)  (0.067)  (0.074) 
           
0.019 0.036 3.060 -0.604 -0.455 -0.515  Log (Duration check 
collection) (0.023)  (0.023)  (1.579)*  (0.184)*** (0.128)*** (0.145)*** 
           
0.320 0.858  119.743  4.520  5.367  4.028  Constant  (0.380) (0.363)**  (22.747)***  (2.226)**  (1.905)*** (2.172)* 
           
Observations  49 62 77  66  69  69 
R-squared  0.13 0.32 0.45  0.34  0.29  0.28 
 
Panel B: ML regulation (State Dept. indices) 96-04 
-0.250 -0.183  -15.429 2.059  1.355  1.148  ML regulation (State 
Dept. indices) 96-04  (0.082)***  (0.081)**  (6.192)** (0.551)*** (0.583)**  (0.602)* 
           
-0.002 -0.030 -3.957  0.051  0.050  0.091  log GDP 2000   (0.013) (0.013)**  (0.778)*** (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.071) 
           
0.016 0.025 2.531 -0.565 -0.471 -0.547  Log (Duration check 
collection) (0.022)  (0.017)  (1.252)**  (0.183)*** (0.104)*** (0.117)*** 
           
0.349 1.010  127.502  3.561  4.964  3.812  Constant  (0.351) (0.314)***  (19.977)*** (2.172)  (1.635)*** (1.860)** 
           
Observations  49 63 78  66  70  70 
R-squared  0.18 0.30 0.45  0.33  0.29  0.29 
 
Panel C: ML regulation FATF convergence index 
-0.234 -0.266  -11.708 1.702  1.612  1.443  ML regulation FATF 
convergence index  (0.088)** (0.061)***  (6.108)*  (0.518)*** (0.469)*** (0.477)*** 
           
-0.006 -0.022 -3.840  0.058  0.051  0.087  log GDP 2000   (0.013) (0.011)*  (0.742)*** (0.068)  (0.057)  (0.062) 
           
0.001 0.025 2.664 -0.565 -0.435 -0.517  Log (Duration check 
collection) (0.019)  (0.017)  (1.351)* (0.214)**  (0.107)***  (0.125)*** 
           
0.488 0.826  119.205  3.910  4.785  3.726  Constant  (0.340) (0.291)***  (19.858)*** (2.498)  (1.575)*** (1.816)** 
           
Observations  46 57 69  58  60  60 
R-squared  0.18 0.37 0.41  0.33  0.38  0.38 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 






Table 9. OLS Regressions for Money Laundering Measures, Controlling by Court Formalism







Tax Evasion  ML via 
banks 
ML non-banks 
-0.128 -0.141 -10.846 1.162  0.870  0.710  ML regulation (State 
Dept. indices) 96-00  (0.059)** (0.049)***  (4.542)**  (0.341)*** (0.380)**  (0.415)* 
           
0.002 -0.013 -3.548  0.028 0.012  0.058  Log GDP 2000   (0.012) (0.009)  (0.700)***  (0.069) (0.069)  (0.081) 
           
0.044 0.062  3.746 -0.419  -0.368 -0.385  Court formalism  (0.013)*** (0.014)***  (1.166)***  (0.113)*** (0.094)***  (0.100)*** 
           
0.047  0.446 112.416 3.492  5.237  3.558  Constant  (0.317) (0.242)*  (17.521)***  (1.988)*  (1.883)*** (2.180) 
           
Observations  50 63  77  67 70  70 
R-squared  0.24 0.45  0.50  0.36 0.34  0.31 
 
Panel B: ML regulation (State Dept. indices) 96-04 
-0.230 -0.171 -14.745 1.776  0.830  0.548  ML regulation (State 
Dept. indices) 96-04  (0.079)***  (0.066)** (5.839)**  (0.472)*** (0.578)  (0.627) 
           
0.005 -0.014 -3.525  0.027 0.022  0.067  Log GDP 2000   (0.012) (0.010)  (0.681)***  (0.069) (0.068)  (0.080) 
           
0.041 0.061  3.731 -0.407  -0.363 -0.383  Court formalism  (0.013)*** (0.014)***  (1.174)***  (0.113)*** (0.093)***  (0.100)*** 
           
0.077  0.506 115.938 2.872  4.938  3.395  Constant  (0.305) (0.237)**  (16.674)***  (2.003)  (1.808)*** (2.089) 
           
Observations  50 64  78  67 71  71 
R-squared  0.28 0.44  0.51  0.36 0.29  0.26 
 
Panel C: ML regulation FATF convergence index 
-0.195 -0.222  -9.394  1.450  1.140  0.906  ML regulation FATF 
convergence index  (0.086)**  (0.060)***  (6.051) (0.515)***  (0.512)**  (0.546) 
           
-0.000 -0.011  -3.186  0.029  0.020  0.059  Log GDP 2000   (0.013) (0.010)  (0.662)***  (0.073) (0.052)  (0.059) 
           
0.034 0.051  4.526 -0.484  -0.410 -0.448  Court formalism  (0.014)** (0.014)*** (1.199)*** (0.143)*** (0.088)***  (0.097)*** 
           
0.185 0.475 98.940 3.535 5.044  3.634  Constant  (0.332) (0.232)**  (17.299)***  (2.204)  (1.444)***  (1.682)** 
           
Observations  47 58  69  59 61  61 
R-squared  0.24 0.46  0.48  0.38 0.41  0.38 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  46  
 
 
Table 10. Tobit Regressions for Money Laundering Measures, Controlling by Log (Duration 
check collection) 







Tax Evasion  ML via 
banks 
ML non-banks 
-0.147 -0.146 -10.913 1.457  1.184  0.995  ML regulation (State 
Dept. indices) 96-00  (0.070)** (0.062)**  (4.752)** (0.429)*** (0.375)***  (0.413)** 
           
-0.005 -0.029  -4.200  0.043  0.034  0.080  Log GDP 2000   (0.012) (0.011)**  (0.829)*** (0.073)  (0.062)  (0.068) 
           
0.022 0.037  3.301 -0.619  -0.467  -0.526  Log (Duration check 
collection) (0.027)  (0.026)  (1.806)*  (0.167)*** (0.143)***  (0.158)*** 
           
0.297  0.898 124.786 4.679  5.625  4.187  Constant  (0.370) (0.340)**  (23.466)***  (2.196)**  (1.823)*** (2.012)** 
           
Observations  49 62  77  66 69  69 
Log likelihood  29.58  34.54  -286.77  -87.04  -82.80  -89.73 
Wald Chi2  7.31  24.03  48.85  26.88  22.53  21.88 
 
Panel B: ML regulation (State Dept. indices) 96-04 
-0.260 -0.185 -15.946 2.115  1.441  1.161  ML regulation (State 
Dept. indices) 96-04  (0.095)*** (0.086)**  (6.549)**  (0.633)*** (0.527)***  (0.580)** 
          
-0.002 -0.031  -4.200  0.048  0.042  0.087  Log GDP 2000   (0.012) (0.011)***  (0.827)*** (0.072)  (0.062)  (0.068) 
          
0.018 0.026  2.733 -0.578 -0.480  -0.556  Log (Duration check 
collection) (0.026)  (0.022)  (1.569)*  (0.166)*** (0.124)***  (0.136)*** 
          
0.332  1.050 132.766 3.677  5.152  3.943  Constant  (0.350) (0.304)***  (21.693)***  (2.152)* (1.662)***  (1.831)** 
          
Observations  49  63 78 66 70  70 
Log likelihood  30.96  34.96  -290.15 -87.22  -84.72  -91.51 
Wald Chi2  10.06  23.28 49.54 26.50 22.72  23.35 
 
Panel C: ML regulation FATF convergence index 
-0.243 -0.265 -11.274 1.730  1.677  1.501  ML regulation FATF 
convergence index  (0.092)**  (0.078)***  (6.681)* (0.650)**  (0.476)*** (0.551)*** 
          
-0.006 -0.023  -4.169  0.055  0.046  0.076  Log GDP 2000   (0.012) (0.011)**  (0.974)*** (0.087)  (0.066)  (0.076) 
          
0.003 0.026  2.931 -0.580 -0.443  -0.575  Log (Duration check 
collection) (0.027)  (0.020)  (1.615)*  (0.186)*** (0.119)***  (0.143)*** 
          
0.473  0.870 125.734 4.052  4.921  4.284  Constant  (0.366) (0.291)***  (25.350)*** (2.577)  (1.808)***  (2.130)** 
          
Observations  46  57 69 58 60  60 
Log likelihood  27.65  36.64  -255.89  -79.47  -67.67  -75.65 
Wald  Chi2  9.02 26.48 38.34 22.65 28.37  27.77 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 11. Tobit Regressions for Money Laundering Measures,  
Controlling by Court Formalism 







Tax Evasion  ML via 
banks 
ML non-banks 
-0.135 -0.142  -11.079 1.217  0.929  0.715  ML regulation (State 
Dept.  indices)  96-00 (0.064)** (0.055)** (4.622)** (0.417)*** (0.353)**  (0.398)* 
           
0.003 -0.014 -3.791  0.022  0.004  0.054  log GDP 2000   (0.011) (0.010)  (0.801)***  (0.072)  (0.061)  (0.068) 
           
0.045 0.062 3.711 -0.433 -0.372  -0.387  Court formalism  (0.016)*** (0.015)*** (1.162)***  (0.104)*** (0.089)***  (0.100)*** 
           
0.033 0.481  118.655  3.665  5.426  3.646  Constant  (0.306) (0.281)*  (20.393)***  (1.937)*  (1.604)*** (1.810)** 
           
Observations  50 63 77  67  70  70 
Log likelihood  33.79  41.79  -283.79  -86.85  -81.07  -89.54 
Wald  Chi2  13.86 37.78 55.36  29.82  28.16  24.98 
 
Panel B: ML regulation (State Dept. indices) 96-04 
-0.238 -0.172 -15.093 1.834  0.904  0.556  ML regulation (State 
Dept. indices) 96-04  (0.088)***  (0.076)**  (6.278)** (0.617)***  (0.517)*  (0.583) 
          
0.005 -0.015 -3.762  0.022  0.014  0.063  log GDP 2000   (0.011) (0.011)  (0.800)***  (0.072)  (0.063)  (0.071) 
          
0.042 0.062  3.694 -0.420 -0.367  -0.385  Court formalism  (0.016)** (0.015)*** (1.155)*** (0.104)*** (0.094)***  (0.106)*** 
          
0.068  0.541 122.141 3.006  5.099  3.488  Constant  (0.294) (0.278)*  (19.806)***  (1.908)  (1.650)*** (1.863)* 
          
Observations  50  64 78 67 71  71 
Log likelihood  35.05  42.27  -287.06  -86.72  -85.72  -94.28 
Wald  Chi2  16.37  37.17 56.28 30.08 22.94  20.57 
 
Panel C: ML regulation FATF convergence index 
-0.203 -0.221  -8.921  1.473  1.193  0.959  ML regulation FATF 
convergence index  (0.089)**  (0.074)***  (6.311) (0.621)**  (0.465)**  (0.553)* 
          
0.000 -0.013 -3.474  0.024  0.015  0.053  log GDP 2000   (0.012) (0.010)  (0.929)***  (0.084)  (0.066)  (0.078) 
          
0.035 0.051  4.629 -0.502 -0.414  -0.471  Court formalism  (0.018)* (0.015)***  (1.288)***  (0.123)*** (0.098)***  (0.117)*** 
          
0.177  0.515 105.476 3.711  5.146  3.864  Constant  (0.318) (0.281)*  (23.627)***  (2.248)  (1.755)*** (2.082)* 
          
Observations  47  58 69 59 61  61 
Log likelihood  30.60  41.47  -251.89  -78.03  -67.31  -77.34 
Wald  Chi2  13.06  35.21 46.85 28.20 31.31  27.24 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  48  
 
Table 12. 2SLS Regressions for Money Laundering Measures, Controlling by Log  
(Duration check collection) 
Panel A: ML regulation (State Dept. indices) 96-00 
Panel A.1: Second Stage regressions 
  Currency demand  Electricity differences  Shadow economy  Tax Evasion  ML via banks  ML non-banks 
-0.174 -0.206  -11.782  1.899  1.664  1.502  ML regulation (State 
Dept. indices) 96-00  (0.102)*  (0.055)***  (7.847)  (0.680)***  (0.494)***  (0.598)** 
            
-0.005 -0.035  -3.710  0.047  0.030  0.062  log GDP 2000   (0.016) (0.013)*** (0.937)***  (0.071)  (0.077)  (0.088) 
            
0.024 0.031  4.306  -0.684  -0.578  -0.606  Log (Duration check 
collection) (0.023)  (0.023)  (1.552)***  (0.177)***  (0.125)***  (0.152)*** 
            
0.294 1.136  107.782  4.613  5.964  4.723  Constant  (0.446) (0.382)*** (23.562)***  (2.240)**  (2.174)***  (2.448)* 
Observations 45  56 69  61  63  63 
F test  1.32  15.59  24.02  19.49  17.95  14.36 
Hansen J statistic  4.89  19.13  16.09  18.49  17.12  14.64 
Panel A.2: First Stage regressions 
  Dependent variable: ML regulation (State Dept. indices) 96-00 
0.024 0.031  0.052  0.040  0.051  0.051  log GDP 2000 
(0.022) (0.018)*  (0.015)***  (0.014)***  (0.014)***  (0.014)*** 
            
-0.038 -0.009  -0.036  -0.028  -0.007  -0.007  Log (Duration check 
collection) (0.059)  (0.048)  (0.043)  (0.040)  (0.039)  (0.039) 
            
0.166 0.194  0.094  0.140  0.125  0.125  Common law  (0.098)* (0.077)**  (0.075)  (0.072)*  (0.067)*  (0.067)* 
            
0.560 0.426  0.285  0.345  0.282  0.282  Latitude  (0.185)*** (0.169)**  (0.144)*  (0.146)**  (0.144)*  (0.144)* 
            
-0.210 -0.281  -0.152  -0.244  -0.323  -0.323  Ethno linguistic 
fractionalization  (0.227) (0.144)*  (0.134)  (0.162)  (0.157)**  (0.157)** 
            
0.004 0.004  0.003  0.004  0.003  0.003  % Catholics  (0.001)*** (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
            
-0.001 -0.003  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  % Muslim  (0.002) (0.001)*  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
            
0.002 0.002  0.003  0.002  0.002  0.002  % Protestant  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)*  (0.001)*  (0.001)  (0.001) 
            
-0.148 -0.393  -0.761  -0.487  -0.831  -0.831  Constant  (0.736) (0.567)  (0.505)  (0.443)  (0.447)*  (0.447)* 
Observations 45  56  69  61  63  63 
Centered R-squared  0.51  0.58  0.54  0.52  0.56  0.56 
F test for excluded 
instruments 
9.47 17.11  7.19  8.78  10.31  10.31 
Panel B: ML regulation (State Dept. indices) 96-04 
Panel B.1: Second Stage regressions 
  Currency demand  Electricity differences  Shadow economy  Tax Evasion  ML via banks  ML non-banks 
-0.233 -0.260 -16.826  2.628  2.116  1.839  ML regulation (State 
Dept. indices) 96-04  (0.136)*  (0.077)***  (10.319)  (0.923)***  (0.724)***  (0.822)** 
            
-0.005 -0.036  -3.807  0.054  0.037  0.069  log GDP 2000   (0.016) (0.013)***  (0.913)***  (0.069)  (0.077)  (0.086) 
            
0.018 0.025  3.354  -0.631  -0.577  -0.628  Log (Duration check 
collection)  (0.021) (0.016)  (1.292)***  (0.181)***  (0.098)***  (0.119)*** 
            
0.390 1.255 120.346  3.384  5.268  4.262  Constant  (0.424) (0.317)***  (20.801)***  (2.217)  (1.875)***  (2.096)** 
Observations 45  57  70  61  64  64 
F test  1.41  16.10  24.74  17.52  17.84  15.54 
Hansen J statistic  4.89  19.98 14.89  17.74  17.38  15.30   49  
 
Panel B.2: First Stage regressions 
  Dependent variable: ML regulation (State Dept. indices) 96-04 
0.019 0.025  0.040  0.027  0.037  0.037  log GDP 2000 
(0.015) (0.013)*  (0.010)***  (0.009)***  (0.011)***  (0.011)*** 
            
-0.056 -0.018  -0.017  -0.040  -0.015  -0.015  Log (Duration check 
collection) (0.044)  (0.023)  (0.026)  (0.030)  (0.025)  (0.025) 
            
0.106 0.131  0.055  0.101  0.103  0.103  Common law  (0.067) (0.053)**  (0.050)  (0.052)*  (0.046)**  (0.046)** 
            
0.439 0.267  0.191  0.260  0.184  0.184  Latitude  (0.146)*** (0.129)**  (0.099)*  (0.099)**  (0.099)*  (0.099)* 
            
-0.112 -0.176  -0.100  -0.138  -0.210  -0.210  Ethno linguistic 
fractionalization  (0.136) (0.083)**  (0.092)  (0.100)  (0.103)**  (0.103)** 
            
0.003 0.002  0.002  0.003  0.002  0.002  % Catholics  (0.001)*** (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
            
-0.001 -0.003  -0.002  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002  % Muslim  (0.002) (0.001)*** (0.001)*  (0.001)  (0.001)*  (0.001)* 
            
0.001 0.001  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  % Protestant  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)*  (0.001)* 
            
0.293 0.018 -0.333  0.058  -0.262  -0.262 
Constant  (0.495) (0.341)  (0.311)  (0.287)  (0.297)  (0.297) 
Observations 45  57  70  61  64  64 
Centered R-squared  0.52  0.64  0.57  0.53  0.59  0.59 
F test for excluded 
instruments  
7.53 21.60  7.55  8.73  9.72  9.72 
Panel C: ML regulation FATF convergence index 
Panel C.1: Second Stage regressions 
  Currency demand  Electricity differences  Shadow economy  Tax Evasion  ML via banks  ML non-banks 
-0.231 -0.413  -26.247  3.174  2.476  2.377  ML regulation FATF 
convergence index  (0.135)*  (0.080)***  (9.270)***  (1.009)***  (0.598)***  (0.704)*** 
            
-0.003 -0.019  -2.729  -0.043  -0.005  0.008  log GDP 2000   (0.018) (0.013) (1.146)**  (0.098)  (0.073)  (0.084) 
            
0.005 0.021  3.438  -0.618  -0.520  -0.579  Log (Duration check 
collection) (0.019)  (0.016)  (1.369)**  (0.226)***  (0.093)***  (0.120)*** 
            
0.368 0.865  95.237  5.883  6.150  5.518  Constant  (0.459) (0.320)***  (27.623)***  (2.929)**  (1.857)***  (2.177)** 
Observations 42  52  62  53  54  54 
F test  1.48  19.21  19.13  15.65  25.37  18.83 
Hansen J statistic  4.19  12.13  7.35  10.75  10.72  11.90 
Panel C.2: First Stage regressions 
  Dependent variable: ML regulation FATF convergence index 
0.019 0.032  0.042  0.034  0.032  0.032  log GDP 2000  (0.019) (0.013)** (0.012)***  (0.014)**  (0.014)**  (0.014)** 
            
-0.097 -0.046  -0.035  -0.057  -0.042  -0.042  Log (Duration check 
collection) (0.044)**  (0.024)*  (0.024)  (0.036)  (0.025)  (0.025) 
            
0.078 0.070  0.084  0.084  0.105  0.105  Common law  (0.060) (0.048)  (0.049)*  (0.060)  (0.055)*  (0.055)* 
            
0.473 0.322  0.375  0.407  0.368  0.368  Latitude  (0.124)*** (0.112)***  (0.119)***  (0.124)***  (0.126)***  (0.126)*** 
            
-0.160 -0.194  -0.159  -0.146  -0.133  -0.133  Ethno linguistic 
fractionalization (0.112)  (0.085)**  (0.078)**  (0.094)  (0.089)  (0.089) 
            
0.001 0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  % Catholics  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)*  (0.001)*  (0.001)  (0.001) 
            
-0.003 -0.004  -0.002  -0.002  -0.003  -0.003  % Muslim  (0.001)** (0.001)***  (0.001)**  (0.001)  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
            
0.001 0.001  0.002  0.001  0.002  0.002  % Protestant  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
              50  
0.461 -0.062  -0.443  -0.152  -0.178  -0.178  Constant  (0.634) (0.379)  (0.371)  (0.509)  (0.439)  (0.439) 
Observations 42  52  62  53  54  54 
Centered R-squared  0.66  0.74  0.73  0.65  0.71  0.71 
F test for excluded 
instruments  
10.97 14.06  11.85  9.00  14.97  14.97 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
   51  
 
Table 13. 2SLS Regressions for Money Laundering Measures, Controlling by Court Formalism 
Panel A: ML regulation (State Dept. indices) 96-00 
Panel A.1: Second Stage regressions 
  Currency demand  Electricity differences  Shadow economy  Tax Evasion  ML via banks  ML non-banks 
-0.177 -0.180 -11.923  1.449  1.236  1.040  ML regulation (State 
Dept. indices) 96-00  (0.088)**  (0.050)***  (7.381)  (0.658)**  (0.484)**  (0.590)* 
            
0.001 -0.020 -3.357  0.046  0.017  0.049  log GDP 2000   (0.014) (0.008)**  (0.736)***  (0.070)  (0.076)  (0.092) 
            
0.042 0.063  4.182  -0.412  -0.365  -0.382  Court formalism  (0.013)*** (0.013)***  (1.156)***  (0.111)***  (0.094)***  (0.101)*** 
            
0.115 0.652  106.637  2.839  4.881  3.564  Constant  (0.362) (0.214)***  (16.052)***  (1.915)  (2.022)**  (2.400) 
Observations 45  56  69  61  63  63 
F test  5.65  25.02  24.96  18.77  15.46  14.92 
Hansen J statistic  2.72  8.18  14.62  6.68  10.19  8.06 
Panel A.2: First Stage regressions 
  Dependent variable: ML regulation (State Dept. indices) 96-00 
0.020 0.027  0.048  0.033  0.040  0.040  log GDP 2000 
(0.022) (0.017)  (0.015)***  (0.014)**  (0.013)***  (0.013)*** 
            
-0.056 -0.025  -0.070  -0.066  -0.062  -0.062  Court formalism  (0.041) (0.038) (0.039)*  (0.037)*  (0.032)*  (0.032)* 
            
0.094 0.161  0.013  0.045  0.036  0.036  Common law  (0.114) (0.089)*  (0.086)  (0.089)  (0.076)  (0.076) 
            
0.483 0.401  0.198  0.275  0.242  0.242  Latitude  (0.214)** (0.185)**  (0.171)  (0.167)  (0.163)  (0.163) 
            
-0.150 -0.266  -0.139  -0.190  -0.264  -0.264  Ethno linguistic 
fractionalization (0.221)  (0.141)*  (0.133)  (0.163)  (0.153)*  (0.153)* 
            
0.004 0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004  % Catholics  (0.001)*** (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
            
-0.001 -0.002  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  % Muslim  (0.002) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
            
0.002 0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  % Protestant  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)*  (0.001)*  (0.001)  (0.001) 
            
0.005 -0.236 -0.549  -0.192  -0.350  -0.350  Constant  (0.567) (0.472)  (0.437)  (0.3611)  (0.347)  (0.347) 
Observations 45  56  69  61  63  63 
Centered R-squared  0.52  0.59  0.56  0.54  0.58  0.58 
F test for excluded 
instruments 
8.48 16.6  9.62  9.20  10.61  10.61 
Panel B: ML regulation (State Dept. indices) 96-04 
Panel B.1: Second Stage regressions 
  Currency demand  Electricity differences  Shadow economy  Tax Evasion  ML via banks  ML non-banks 
-0.256 -0.215  -16.142  1.938  1.064  0.688  ML regulation (State 
Dept. indices) 96-04  (0.123)** (0.071)***  (9.633)*  (0.902)**  (0.817)  (0.953) 
            
0.003 -0.020 -3.344  0.052  0.035  0.070  log GDP 2000   (0.014) (0.008)**  (0.717)***  (0.071)  (0.075)  (0.090) 
            
0.039 0.063 4.175  -0.402  -0.361  -0.382 
Court formalism  (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (1.168)***  (0.113)***  (0.092)***  (0.100)*** 
            
0.161 0.706  110.723  2.105  4.425  3.234  Constant  (0.347) (0.210)***  (14.871)***  (1.969)  (1.900)**  (2.246) 
Observations 45  57  70  61  64  64 
F test  6.04  25.31  26.92  18.19  12.72  11.98 
Hansen J statistic  2.54  9.84  13.88  7.07  10.56  8.83 
Panel B.2: First Stage regressions 
  Dependent variable: ML regulation (State Dept. indices) 96-04 
0.018 0.021 0.034  0.023  0.028  0.028  log GDP 2000 
(0.016) (0.012)  (0.011)***  (0.009)**  (0.009)***  (0.009)*** 
            
-0.059 -0.033  -0.05302  -0.056  -0.05  -0.05  Court formalism  (0.027)** (0.025)  (0.028)*  (0.026)**  (0.023)**  (0.023)**   52  
            
0.031 0.087 -0.009  0.023  0.026  0.026  Common law  (0.081) (0.065) (0.059)  (0.065)  (0.054)  (0.054) 
            
0.34 0.232  0.137  0.187  0.144  0.144  Latitude  (0.152)** (0.132)*  (0.107)  (0.105)*  (0.106)  (0.106) 
            
-0.044 -0.158 -0.093  -0.093  -0.161  -0.161  Ethno linguistic 
fractionalization (0.129)  (0.086)*  (0.090)  (0.103)  (0.100)  (0.100) 
            
0.003 0.003 0.002  0.003  0.003  0.003  % Catholics  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
            
-0.001 -0.003 -0.001  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002  % Muslim  (0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)**  (0.001)** 
            
0.001 0.001 0.002  0.002  0.001  0.001  % Protestant  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)  (0.001) 
            
0.289 0.172 -0.075  0.172  0.103  0.103 
Constant 
(0.405) (0.322) (0.303)  (0.239)  (0.227)  (0.227) 
Observations 45  57  70  61  64  64 
Centered R-squared  0.54  0.64  0.59  0.55  0.62  0.62 
F test for excluded 
instruments  
7.00 23.82  10.61  8.22  12.63  12.63 
Panel C: ML regulation FATF convergence index 
Panel C.1: Second Stage regressions 
  Currency demand  Electricity differences  Shadow economy  Tax Evasion  ML via banks  ML non-banks 
-0.220 -0.334  -21.970  2.422  1.526  1.333  ML regulation FATF 
convergence index  (0.133)* (0.085)***  (9.260)**  (1.030)**  (0.815)*  (0.949) 
            
0.002 -0.013 -2.426  -0.017  0.014  0.030  log GDP 2000   (0.017) (0.011)  (0.974)**  (0.094)  (0.060)  (0.079) 
            
0.031 0.047 4.324  -0.453  -0.398  -0.435  Court formalism  (0.016)** (0.015)***  (1.268)***  (0.149)***  (0.090)***  (0.099)*** 
            
0.150 0.620  87.652  4.026  4.949  4.112  Constant  (0.400) (0.245)**  (21.857)***  (2.332)*  (1.448)***  (1.879)** 
Observations 42  52  62  53  54  54 
F test  4.83  26.55  24.35  17.71  18.15  15.85 
Hansen J statistic  3.60  7.22  7.46  5.38  8.21  7.92 
Panel C.2: First Stage regressions 
  Dependent variable: ML regulation FATF convergence index 
0.029 0.030 0.041  0.038  0.038  0.038  log GDP 2000 
(0.015)* (0.011)**  (0.011)***  (0.013)***  (0.013)  (0.013) 
            
-0.067 -0.043 -0.034  -0.03202  -0.03202  -0.03202  Court formalism  (0.028)** (0.025)*  (0.024)  (0.029)  (0.027)  (0.027) 
            
-0.005 0.017 0.041  0.051  0.051  0.051  Common law  (0.082)* (0.062)  (0.061)  (0.079)  (0.073)  (0.073) 
            
0.308 0.268 0.330  0.342  0.342  0.342  Latitude  (0.142)** (0.117)** (0.127)**  (0.138)**  (0.137)  (0.137) 
            
-0.083 -0.168 -0.142  -0.121  -0.121  -0.121  Ethno linguistic 
fractionalization (0.112)  (0.097)*  (0.082)*  (0.103)  (0.097)  (0.097) 
            
0.001 0.001 0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  % Catholics  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)*  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
            
-0.003 -0.003 -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  % Muslim  (0.001) (0.001)***  (0.001)**  (0.001)  (0.0009969)  (0.0009969) 
            
0.001 0.001 0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  % Protestant  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
            
0.004 -0.091 -0.457  -0.410  -0.410  -0.410  Constant  (0.410) (0.325) (0.321)  (0.404)  (0.398)  (0.398) 
Observations 42  52  62  53  54  54 
Centered R-squared  0.64  0.73  0.72  0.63  0.70  0.70 
F test for excluded 
instruments  
6.97 13.96  12.44  6.78  13.36  13.36 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   53  
 
 
Table 14. OLS Regressions for Each State Department Sub-Index (1996-2004) 







Tax Evasion  ML via 
banks 
ML non-banks 
-0.117 -0.102  -9.067  1.189  0.864  0.675  Financial syst. reg. 
sub-index (0.061)*  (0.061)  (4.670)* (0.375)***  (0.416)**  (0.414) 
           
-0.010 -0.035  -4.276  0.092  0.082  0.120  log GDP 2000   (0.013) (0.011)***  (0.750)*** (0.064)  (0.059)  (0.065)* 
           
0.015 0.024  2.570 -0.571  -0.461 -0.536  Log (Duration check 
collection) (0.023)  (0.018)  (1.309)*  (0.190)*** (0.105)***  (0.117)*** 
           
0.454  1.099 130.829 3.182  4.466  3.354  Constant  (0.367) (0.298)***  (20.215)*** (2.220) (1.570)*** (1.780)* 
           
Observations  49 63  78  66 70  70 
R-squared  0.11 0.28  0.44  0.29 0.27  0.28 
 
Panel B: Criminalization sub-index 
-0.225 -0.209 -14.807 2.054  1.372  1.287  Criminalization  
sub-index (0.067)***  (0.062)***  (4.670)*** (0.514)*** (0.521)**  (0.585)** 
           
-0.005 -0.027  -4.155  0.051  0.046  0.080  log GDP 2000   (0.012) (0.012)**  (0.652)*** (0.061)  (0.058)  (0.068) 
           
0.014 0.027  2.294 -0.548  -0.470 -0.551  Log (Duration check 
collection) (0.022)  (0.016)  (1.214)*  (0.180)*** (0.105)***  (0.120)*** 
           
0.426  0.978 134.011 3.401  4.997  3.940  Constant  (0.354) (0.291)***  (17.611)*** (2.095) (1.535)*** (1.811)** 
           
Observations  49 63 78  66  70  70 
R-squared  0.18 0.34 0.46  0.36  0.31  0.32 
 
Panel C: International cooperation sub-index 
-0.372 -0.152 -13.784 1.783  0.978  0.751  International coop. 
sub-index (0.112)***  (0.120)  (8.979) (0.646)***  (0.645)  (0.621) 
           
0.007 -0.032 -4.062  0.055 0.066  0.108  log GDP 2000   (0.014) (0.014)**  (0.932)*** (0.066)  (0.067)  (0.070) 
           
0.017 0.022  2.349 -0.558  -0.447 -0.524  Log (Duration check 
collection) (0.020)  (0.018)  (1.319)*  (0.190)*** (0.102)***  (0.113)*** 
           
0.162  1.047 129.152 3.753  4.778  3.585  Constant  (0.343) (0.341)***  (22.530)***  (2.202)* (1.636)***  (1.816)* 
           
Observations  49 63  78  66 70  70 
R-squared  0.25 0.28  0.44  0.29 0.25  0.27 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 15. OLS Regressions for Each FATF Sub-Index 
Panel A: Financial syst. reg. sub-index 
 Currency  ratio  Electricity  differences  Shadow economy  Tax Evasion  ML via banks  ML non-banks 
-0.266 -0.250  -7.172  1.058  1.303  1.075  Financial syst. reg. 
sub-index (0.077)***  (0.061)***  (6.328) (0.568)*  (0.497)**  (0.446)** 
            
-0.007 -0.025  -4.224  0.097  0.081  0.118  log GDP 2000   (0.013) (0.011)** (0.777)***  (0.070)  (0.055)  (0.058)** 
            
0.003 0.025  2.653  -0.586  -0.424  -0.506  Log (Duration 
check collection)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (1.453)*  (0.221)**  (0.105)***  (0.122)*** 
            
0.525 0.906  126.383  3.408  4.153  3.091  Constant  (0.333) (0.280)*** (20.890)***  (2.541)  (1.490)***  (1.726)* 
            
Observations 46  57  69 58  60  60 
R-squared 0.22  0.36  0.39 0.28  0.35  0.35 
 
Panel B: Criminalization sub-index 
-0.187 -0.226  -16.986  2.251  1.826  1.748  Criminalization  
sub-index (0.071)**  (0.065)***  (5.219)*** (0.471)***  (0.425)***  (0.516)*** 
            
-0.006 -0.021  -3.264  0.006  0.017  0.048  log GDP 2000   (0.014) (0.013) (0.788)***  (0.067)  (0.060)  (0.072) 
            
0.002 0.024  2.672  -0.532  -0.425  -0.509  Log (Duration 
check collection)  (0.020)  (0.017)  (1.238)**  (0.204)**  (0.105)***  (0.123)*** 
            
0.430 0.796 107.841  4.690  5.450  4.463  Constant  (0.359) (0.312)**  (20.515)***  (2.405)*  (1.606)***  (1.948)** 
            
Observations 46  57  69 58  60 60 
R-squared 0.16  0.36 0.45 0.41  0.45 0.45 
 
Panel C: International cooperation sub-index 
-0.163 -0.235  -9.119  1.465  1.235  1.115  International coop. 
sub-index (0.084)*  (0.061)***  (5.003)* (0.498)***  (0.459)***  (0.441)** 
            
-0.010 -0.024  -4.183  0.076  0.082  0.113  log GDP 2000   (0.014) (0.011)** (0.679)***  (0.068)  (0.059)  (0.061)* 
            
0.003 0.029  2.522  -0.582  -0.448  -0.529  Log (Duration 
check collection)  (0.021)  (0.017)*  (1.372)*  (0.210)***  (0.114)***  (0.128)*** 
            
0.533 0.860 127.035  3.695  4.317  3.317  Constant  (0.370) (0.288)***  (19.537)***  (2.496)  (1.621)**  (1.816)* 
            
Observations 46  57  69 58  60  60 
R-squared 0.12  0.36 0.41 0.32  0.34  0.35 
 
Panel D: Administrative authorities sub-index 
-0.183 -0.201  -4.938  1.047  1.154  0.998  Admin. authority 
sub-index  (0.084)** (0.054)***  (5.457)  (0.434)**  (0.422)***  (0.413)** 
            
-0.008 -0.026  -4.331  0.091  0.076  0.111  log GDP 2000   (0.013) (0.011)**  (0.745)***  (0.072)  (0.058)  (0.060)* 
            
0.002 0.025  2.656  -0.574  -0.427  -0.509  Log (Duration 
check collection)  (0.021)  (0.018)  (1.451)*  (0.220)**  (0.106)***  (0.124)*** 
            
0.493 0.890  127.706  3.527  4.406  3.349  Constant  (0.342) (0.294)***  (20.674)***  (2.579)  (1.590)***  (1.788)* 
            
Observations 46  57  69 58  60  60 
R-squared 0.24  0.45  0.50 0.36  0.34  0.31 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   55  
 
 
Table 16. Horse Race among the Sub-Indices, OLS Regressions 
Panel A:  State Department indices(96-00) 
 Currency  ratio  Electricity  differences  Shadow conomy  Tax Evasion  ML via banks  ML non-banks 
0.119 0.142 5.569  -0.787  -0.416  -0.905  Financial syst. reg. 
sub-index (0.091)  (0.091)  (7.463) (0.727)  (0.579)  (0.616) 
            
-0.083 -0.240 -9.100  1.490  1.465  1.636  Criminalization  
sub-index (0.084)  (0.077)***  (6.190) (0.487)***  (0.475)***  (0.552)*** 
            
-0.313 -0.110 -11.800  1.273  0.170  0.631  International coop. 
sub-index (0.138)**  (0.155)  (13.466) (0.981) (0.753)  (0.845) 
            
0.004 -0.021 -3.713  -0.002  0.026  0.047  log GDP 2000   (0.014) (0.013)  (0.986)***  (0.062)  (0.061)  (0.072) 
            
0.018 0.034 2.785  -0.596  -0.447  -0.502  Log (Duration check 
collection) (0.023)  (0.021)  (1.598)* (0.186)***  (0.128)***  (0.151)*** 
            
0.140 0.752  117.977  5.378  5.668  4.665  Constant  (0.378) (0.351)**  (26.307)***  (1.996)***  (1.715)***  (2.009)** 
Observations 49  62  77 66  69  69 
R-squared 0.22  0.38  0.47 0.38  0.34  0.35 
 
Panel B: State Department indices(96-04) 
0.139 0.063 3.989  -0.434  0.110  -0.311  Financial syst. reg. 
sub-index  (0.077)* (0.084)  (7.047) (0.643)  (0.507)  (0.537) 
            
-0.225 -0.221 -12.964  1.905  1.302  1.430  Criminalization  
sub-index (0.106)**  (0.103)**  (7.001)* (0.664)***  (0.674)*  (0.744)* 
            
-0.277 -0.095 -10.472  1.120  0.023  0.471  International coop. 
sub-index (0.136)**  (0.166)  (13.646) (0.978)  (0.767)  (0.850) 
            
0.005 -0.023 -3.723  0.014  0.049  0.073  log GDP 2000   (0.014) (0.015)  (0.996)***  (0.064)  (0.066)  (0.075) 
            
0.013 0.030 2.609  -0.549  -0.417  -0.468  Log (Duration check 
collection) (0.024)  (0.023)  (1.587) (0.191)***  (0.134)***  (0.153)*** 
            
0.235 0.876  123.533  4.063  4.599  3.475  Constant  (0.385) (0.393)**  (27.260)***  (2.125)*  (1.882)**  (2.086) 
Observations 49  62  77  66  69  69 
R-squared 0.26  0.34  0.47 0.37  0.30  0.30 
 
Panel C: FATF regulation  indices 
0.191 0.095  1.551  -0.354  0.192  -0.037  Financial syst. reg. 
sub-index (0.120)  (0.120)  (7.680) (0.848)  (0.703)  (0.734) 
            
-0.200 -0.275 -14.035  1.957  1.337  1.472  Criminalization  
sub-index (0.117)*  (0.119)**  (7.532)* (0.653)***  (0.629)**  (0.738)* 
            
-0.425 -0.045  -4.501 0.930  -0.243  -0.319  International coop. 
sub-index (0.180)**  (0.203)  (14.585) (1.180)  (1.040)  (1.045) 
            
0.010 -0.026 -4.021 0.025  0.053  0.090  log GDP 2000   (0.014) (0.014)*  (0.895)***  (0.064)  (0.062)  (0.068) 
            
0.014 0.026  2.286  -0.546  -0.471  -0.546  Log (Duration check 
collection) (0.022)  (0.016)  (1.233)* (0.188)***  (0.110)***  (0.125)*** 
            
0.149 0.959  131.931  3.740  4.876  3.777  Constant  (0.359) (0.318)***  (21.789)***  (2.050)*  (1.528)***  (1.740)** 
Observations 49  63  78  66  70  70 
R-squared 0.30  0.34  0.46 0.36  0.31  0.32 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%